

Comparative Study on Implementation Outcomes of UNCTAD 40-40-20 and cabotage Maritime Policies in Nigeria

Nwokedi, Theophilus C., Gbasibo Lawrence Addah, Nwosu Emmanuel Nnadozie, Ufia Friday & Adaka Joseph

Abstract:

Maritime policies like general transport policies over the years have remained a veritable tool for planning the development of the maritime transport sub-sector in Nigeria and other nations. Experience in most developing African countries has shown that African nations are not lacking in the development of well thought-out policy blue prints for the development of her maritime sectors; they rather have poor policy implementation strategies as past records have shown; thus culminating into the failure and total abandonment of well thought-out maritime development policy plans. An example is the UNCTAD 40-40-20 policy which has helped similar maritime nations as Nigeria to develop adequate capacities in carriage of their seaborne trade and fleet size but has failed to achieve the same feet in Nigeria. The study was thus carried out to assess the implementation outcomes of the defunct UNCTAD 40-40-20 policy in Nigeria, in comparison with the outcomes of the current cabotage policy being implemented by the Nigeria maritime Administration and safety Agency. The historical research design method was used and secondary data were collected and used for the study. The data collected were analyzed using the difference of means model, independent sample t-test and trend analysis. It result showed a decreasing trend in fleet ownership by Nigeria in both UNCTAD 40-40-20 era and cabotage era. The comparative analysis between the indigenous tonnages in the cabotage and UNCTAD 40-40-20 regimes revealed that the mean tonnages of the indigenous ship owners per annum in the cabotage and UNCTAD 40-40-20 regimes are 229477.2145tons and 279286.3636 respectively over the 11 years period covered in the study. There exists a difference in means of -49809.14909 in favour of the indigenous tonnage in the UNCTAD 40-40-20 regime. These imply similar implementation outcomes in both policies. It was recommended that improvement should be made in the implementation of the current cabotage regime to save it from similar failure like the UNCTAD 40-40-20 regime.

Keywords: UNCTAD 40-40-20, cabotage, implementation, outcomes, Nigeria.



IJSB

Accepted 04 November 2018

Published 21 November 2018

DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.1493045

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1.0 Introduction

Transport planning over the years has remained the tool by which the provision of transport infrastructural facilities and the subsequent management and administration for economic development and sustenance has been ensured by governments. Since transport is a public good and the fore runner and fulcrum upon which economic development of economies depend, it becomes necessary that the provision of transport infrastructure and the management must be planned proactively and strategically using policies and Acts of law as instruments for transport development. In the maritime transport subsector, this is achieved usually by use of maritime/shipping policies. Key examples of veritable maritime/shipping policies which has bettered maritime operations in the global and national blue ocean economies include the merchant shipping Act 1962, Cabotage policy 2001, marine insurance Act 1990, UNCTAD 40-40-20 policy, international ship and port facility security Code policy, maritime labor legislation, etc. one may therefore opine that maritime/ shipping policies are rules, regulations and Acts of parliament made by countries; who in most cases adopt instruments of international conventions, agreements and regulations of the International Maritime Organizations for purposes of planning infrastructural provisions, safe operation and security administration of maritime transport and shipping. Maritime policies may aim at improving indigenous shipping capacity and participation in maritime transport, funding and financing of maritime transport operation and infrastructure, seafarers development and human capacity improvement in the maritime sector, maritime security management and safety management, etc (Peter 2003, Goss, 1990; Ajesseni 1999). The United Nations Conference on trade and Development (UNCTAD) 40-40-20 policy is a policy developed for the maritime transport/shipping industry to ensure the participation of seaborne cargo origination countries as well as seaborne cargo destination countries in the sea carriage/shipping of their export and import consignments (UNCTAD, 2011). The key reason is to enable all such countries develop and acquire shipping fleets and technology that will enable them be involved in the liner trade by taking advantage of the seaborne cargo originating status or destination status to develop links in the liner trade and benefits maximally from international shipping trade (Wakil, 2012).

Wakil, (2012) observes that the Code was adopted in Geneva in April 1974, to become effective six months after ratification by at least 24 nations controlling 25% of the world's tonnage. This was accommodated in the United Nations Conference of Plenipotentiaries on a Code of Conduct for Liner Conferences, vol. II, Final Act (including the Convention and resolutions) and tonnage requirements Annex I (Art. 49) at 18, U.N. Doc. TD/CODE/13/Add. 1 (1975) thereafter cited as UNCTAD Liner Code. This was accomplished in April 1983, when 58 countries representing 28.6% of the world's liner tonnage (measured in 1974) had ratified the UNCTAD Code. International Ocean shipping in most of the world is dominated by shipping cartels, organized to function under shipping conferences. These shipping Conferences were known to usually operate on specific trade routes between two or more nations/ regions --e.g., United Kingdom West African Conference Lines (UKWAL). Members of Conference lines are known to usually agree on freight rates to be charged and on levels of service to be offered, thus exposing the shippers in the regions they operate to something similar to monopolistic trade influences and limitations of transport option choices as their existed no alternatives to the conference lines such that even when the shipper is unsatisfied with the level and quality of services offered by the members of the conference lines such shippers were limited by the almost absence of alternative competing carriers. In order to avoid the supply of excess cargo space, most conference lines restrict their membership (are

closed) limit the amount of cargo space that each member may supply within a specific time period (they rationalize their sailings). Thus by strategically cutting capacity supply in order that freight rates remains high to their favour and blocking new entrances into the sea carrier trade, conferences lines grew as powerful cartels with monopolistic market characteristics making it almost impossible for poor countries with sizable export and import cargo capacities to reap maximally from the benefits of their in seaborne trade transactions as they neither participate in the carriage nor have assurances of quality and fair and competitive freight rates. Though independents carriers which are carriers in a specific trade that are not members of a conference exists, they are discriminated upon and are influenced by the activities of the conference lines and termed independent outsiders such that a carrier can belong to a conference in one trade and be an independent in another (Wakil, 2012, Martinez and Zan, 2004). Zerby (1979) wrote that following the adverse influences of the activities of the conference lines, developing countries consistently expressed dissatisfaction with liner conferences for ignoring their specific needs and for maintaining a rate system which is believed to be discriminatory with respect to their exports. This culminated in the development of the UNCTAD 40-40-20 policy. Specifically in 1974, the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) formulated a Code of Conduct for liner conferences which was aimed primarily at addressing the grievances of developing countries (Zerby, 1979). Zerby (1989) and Turbergen (1962) notes that the part of the Code which received the greatest amount of attention is the cargo-sharing scheme, according to it, nations which generate cargo are said to be entitled to participate in the ocean transport of the goods in proportion to their contribution to world trade. 40% of the trade is informally allotted to each of the two trading nations (ie; the 40% each for cargo originating and destination countries), leaving 20% for cross traders (carriers from other nations which are not part of the cargo origin and destination countries). Thus the name: UNCTAD 40-40-20 policy. Leslie (2001) and Ayodeji (2004) pointed out that a reduction in freight rates on exports may require a rise in import rates in order to achieve a balance in total voyage revenue. Thus if one specific nation succeeds in generating increased export tonnage as a result of a drop in rates on exports, it is likely to be at the expense of other developing countries, leaving the share of total trade unchanged. Schler (2016) notes that the Federal Government of Nigeria formed the Nigerian National Shipping Line (NNSL) in 1957 while it started operations in 1959. According to Arihoubor (2010), at formation, 33% of the capital was held by the Elder Dempster Line and 16% by the Palm Line, both British companies, while the Nigerian government held 51% but by 1961, the Nigerian government acquired all the shares. Having commenced operations in 1959 with three vessels which grew to 16 and 24 ocean going vessels in 1964 and 1974 respectively; it was expectedly viewed as pivotal tool that spur Nigeria's drive to use the UNCTAD 40-40-20 policy to advance her interest in the carriage of her seaborne trade and global shipping trade. The country was thus one of the many developing nations that took active steps towards implementing the UNCTAD 40-40-20 cargo sharing formula with the NNSL positioned to take full advantage of the policy.

Thus the UNCTAD 40:40:20 cargo sharing formula, was introduced by Decree 10 to 1987, and was aimed strictly at cargo reservation for indigenous shipping companies (Oluwakemi, 2014). The Act was originally promulgated as the National Shipping Policy Decree No. 10 in 1987 as fallout of the United Nations Convention on Trade and Development Code of Conduct for Liner Conference popularly known as the "UNCTAD Liner Code", a developing nations initiative which in its Article 47(i) specifically requires contracting parties to "take such legislative or other measures as may be necessary to implement the Convention". Although

adopted in 1974, the UNCTAD Liner Code finally came into force in October, 1983 (Ndikom, 2006). The 40:40:20 formula of the UNCTAD Liner Code allows each country between two trading party states the right for its lines to carry up to 40% of liner conference cargo whilst the remaining 20% is left for cross liners (or third party countries' liners) to carry (Oluwakemi, 2014). Nigeria, a signatory to the UNCTAD Liner Code, thus incorporated in its laws in 1987, the UNCTAD Liner Code's cargo sharing principle by stipulating in Section 9(4) of the Act that the participating national carriers in the carriage of bulk cargo to and from Nigeria shall be subject to carriage of not less than 50% of such cargo and that cargo sharing shall cover the totality of available trade including bulk dry and wet cargo and shall not be limited to the UNCTAD 40:40:20 formula (Oluwakemi, 2014). In other words, under the cargo sharing policy, national carriers are to take part in lifting not less than 50% of all cargo from and into Nigeria while foreign liners are to lift the remnant 50% per cent of such cargo. To implement the cargo sharing policy, the Nigeria maritime Authority (NMA) now Nigeria maritime Administration and safety agency (NIMASA) was established. NMA must thus grant a national carrier status to indigenous shipping companies who must participate in the UNCTAD 40-40-20 cargo sharing policy under Section 7 of the Act. At least 60% of such companies equity shares must be owned by Nigerians while it must own at least one ocean-going vessel of not less than 5000 net registered tonnage which must be registered in the Nigerian Register of Ships (Oluwakemi, 2014). Studies by Ndikom(2006) revealed that Nigeria dependent almost entire on the fleet size of the NNSL for the implementation of the UNCTAD 40-40-20 policy because other indigenous shipping lines granted national carrier status by the defunct NMA were brief case shipping lines having no ocean going vessels and who sell all such cargo allocations to them under the cargo sharing policy to foreign shipping lines. Thus with the liquidation of the NNSL in July 1995, the foreign domination of ocean shipping trade in Nigeria worsened. Studies by Wakil (2012) suggests that the NNSL was liquidated over series of cases of indebtedness to foreign creditors who kept seizing the company's vessels one after the other and auctioning them on international waters to recover their fund. It is however disheartening that as at the time of the liquidation of the NNSL; the country had not developed any form of capacity for carrying substantial part of her seaborne trade (Wakil, 2012). The tide of foreign domination of Nigeria's ocean shipping trade which the 40-40-20 policy sort to address continues to soar as the countries remained helpless following the failure of the UNCTAD 40-40-20 policy in Nigeria.

The Nigerian government was motivated to set up a second direct policy intervention to improving local content in maritime transport in Nigeria through the Nigerian Maritime Administration and Safety Agency (NIMASA) in other to perfectly break the dominance of the Nigerian maritime industry by foreigners and protect indigenous operators' imminent extinction. A policy framework was developed as an Act of parliament and termed "An Act to restrict the use of foreign vessels in domestic coastal trade to promote the development of indigenous tonnage and to establish a cabotage vessel financing fund; and for other related matters". This policy is popularly referred to as the cabotage policy and contains the blue print and serious intention of government to grow the fleet size and tonnage capacity of indigenous operators in the sector as well as encourage indigenous shipyards to develop ship building capacity while providing for manning of coastal vessels using indigenous maritime labour. The drive is to achieve adequate indigenous maritime fleet and tonnage capacity as well as develop shipbuilding capacity and technical know-how to stem the tide of foreign domination of the countries maritime sector such that what the UNCTAD 40-40-20 policy could not achieve for the nation, the current cabotage policy can achieve if well implemented.

To be eligible therefore for the coastal trade a vessel must be wholly owned and wholly crewed by Nigeria citizen, it must also be built and registered in Nigeria. It is important to however state as revealed by available literature that the current strategy of implementation of the cabotage policy seem to ignore the very pitfalls which led to the unsuccessful implementation of the UNCTAD 40-40-20 policy as the Nigerian maritime industry still grapple with the challenge of foreign domination and poor indigenous capacity in the area of fleet size, tonnage capacity, quality seafarers supply and ship building needed to fully get integrated into the maritime sector and compete favourably with foreign ship owners and operator who currently still dominate Nigeria coastal and ocean shipping trade. At present, revenue is being lost to foreign carriers and jobs for Nigerian seamen are being lost. It has therefore become imperative to investigate and compare the implementation effects/results of the UNCTAD 40-40-20 policy using mostly the NNSL and the current cabotage policy so as to provide knowledge and understanding of the level of indigenous fleet size and tonnage capacity and Nigeria content in both regimes with a view to providing proper guide for the maritime policy implementation agencies; in order that Nigeria's expectations from the current cabotage regime may be achieved by strategically guiding the implementation of cabotage out of the pitfalls that wrecked the UNCTAD 40-40-20 policy in Nigeria.

2.0 Objectives of the Study

The aim of the study is to compare the outcome of the implementation of the UNCTAD 40-40-20 policy and the current cabotage regime in Nigeria. The specific objectives of the research are:

- (i) To estimate the trend of fleet ownership of indigenous operators in the UNCTAD 40-40-20 regime.
- (ii) To determine the trend of fleet ownership of indigenous ship owners in the cabotage regime.
- (iii) To compare the tonnage capacities of indigenous ship owners in the UNCTAD 40-40-20 regime and cabotage regime.
- (iv) To compare the fleet size of indigenous operators in the UNCTAD 40-40-20 and cabotage regimes.

2.1 Hypotheses

- (i) There is no significant increase in fleet size of indigenous ship owners in the UNCTAD 40-40-20 era.
- (ii) The fleet size of indigenous ship owners in the cabotage regime does not show significant increase in trend.
- (iii) There is no significant difference between the tonnage capacities of indigenous ship owners in the UNCTAD 40-40-20 regime and cabotage regime.

3.0 Methodology

The study adopted a historical survey research design method in which historical data on fleet size and tonnage capacity of indigenous ship operators were obtained and analyzed using statistical methods. The data used in the work were sourced from the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) statistical bulletin, and annual publication of the Nigerian Maritime Administration and safety Agency. Trend analysis was used to analyze the fleet size of indigenous operators in the cabotage and UNCTAD 40-40-20 eras. The study employed the independent sample t-test and the difference of means methods to compare the means of the

fleet size of indigenous ship owners in the two eras as well as the tonnage of indigenous ship operators in the two eras.

4.0 Results and Discussion of Findings

4.1 Trend Result of the Fleet Size of indigenous Operators in the UNCTAD 40-40-20 Regime

Descriptive Statistics

	Mean	Std. Deviation	N
unctadfleet	19.8182	4.26188	11
Time	6.0000	3.31662	11

Model Summary

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate
1	.934 ^a	.872	.858	1.60680

Model		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
1	Regression	158.400	1	158.400	61.352	.000 ^b
	Residual	23.236	9	2.582		
	Total	181.636	10			

a. Dependent Variable: unctadfleet


b. Predictors: (Constant), Time

Coefficients^a

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
		B	Std. Error	Beta		
1	(Constant)	27.018	1.039		26.002	.000
	Time	-1.200	.153	-.934	-7.833	.000

Source: Authors calculation.

The result of the trend analysis on the fleet size of indigenous ship owners in the UNCTAD 40-40-20 regime indicates a mean fleet size of 19.818 vessels per annum with a standard deviation of 4.26 over the 11 years period covered in the study. The trend equation showing the relationship between fleet size and time over the period is $Y = 27.02 - 1.20 + e$. This indicates a decreasing trend in fleet ownership by Nigeria over the period. The trend line showing this decreasing relationship over the period is shown below:



Source: The linear regression relationship between UNCTAD and Years, From the analysis, the trend line showing trend of fleet ownership by the indigenous ship operators in the UNCTAD 40-40-20 era is : $Y = 27.02 - 1.2X + e$. where Y = fleet size, X = time.

The negative coefficient of the explanatory variable indicates there exist a decreasing trend in the fleet size of Nigerian operators from 1982 to 1992 covering the UNCTAD 40-40-20 regime. We infer based on the result that there existed a decreasing trend in fleet size of indigenous owners in the UNCTAD 40-40-20 era. Considering the Coefficients of determination R is -0.934 and shows that the fleet size of indigenous owners in UNCTAD is negatively correlated to time (operational years) but there is a strong linear relationship between them. The value of $R^2 = 0.87$ indicates that 87% of the total variation in indigenous vessels in UNCTAD is explained by increase in years of operation.

4.2. Trend Result of the Fleet Size of indigenous Operators in the present cabotage Regime

Descriptive Statistics

	Mean	Std. Deviation	N
cabotagefleet	219.7273	107.77949	11
Time	6.0000	3.31662	11

ANOVA^a

Model		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
1	Regression	317.900	1	317.900	.025	.879 ^b
	Residual	115846.282	9	12871.809		
	Total	116164.182	10			

a. Dependent Variable: cabotagefleet

b. Predictors: (Constant), Time

Coefficients^a


Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
		B	Std. Error	Beta		
1	(Constant)	229.927	73.367		3.134	.012
	Time	-1.700	10.817	-.052	-.157	.879

Source: Authors calculation

The result of the trend analysis indicates that the mean fleet size of the indigenous operators over the 11 years period covered in the study is 219.7 vessels with a standard deviation of 107.7. Trend line showing the influence of time on the fleet size of the indigenous ship owners in the cabotage regime is :

$$Y = 229.93 - 1.7X + e.$$

This indicates that there is equally a decreasing trend in the fleet size of indigenous ship owners in the current cabotage regime. The trend line is represented geometrically as show below:



Source : A scatter plot and linear regression between Cabotage population and Years.

There exists a negative linear relationship between the fleet size in the cabotage regime and increasing years of implementation of the policy. This is exactly similar to the result of the effect of the implementation of the UNCTAD 40-40-20 policy on fleet size of indigenous ship owners. As the year increase, there was a general rapid decrease in Cabotage regime fleet size as shown by the result.

4.3 Comparing the tonnages of indigenous ship owners in the Cabotage and UNCTAD 40-40-20 regimes.

Independent Samples Statistics

	Mean	N	Std. Deviation	Std. Error Mean
cabotageTonnage	229477.2145	11	92574.10890	27912.14405
unctadTonnage	279286.3636	11	52471.99601	15820.90207

independent Samples Test

	Differences				
	Mean	Std. Deviation	Std. Error Mean	Error	95% Confidence Interval of the Difference
					Lower
cabotageTonnage unctadTonnage	-49809.14909	114296.51919	34461.69718		-126594.59549

Independent Samples Test

	Mean Differences	t	df	Sig. (2-tailed)
	95% Confidence Interval of the Difference			
	Upper			
cabotageTonnage unctadTonnage	26976.29731	-1.445	10	.179

Source: Authors calculation

The comparative analysis between the indigenous tonnages in the cabotage and UNCTAD 40-40-20 regimes reveals that the mean tonnages of the indigenous ship owners per annum in the cabotage and UNCTAD 40-40-20 regimes are 229477.2145 tons and 279286.3636 respectively with respective standard deviations of 92574.10890 and 52471.99601 over the 11 years implementation periods used in the study. The result of the analysis shows a difference in means of -49809.14909 in favour of the indigenous tonnage in the UNCTAD 40-40-20 regime with a standard deviation of 114296.51919. The standard error is 34461.69718. This implies that the indigenous tonnage capacity in the UNCTAD 40-40-20 regime is greater than that of the present cabotage regime by 49809 tons. The indication is that higher capacity vessels were used by the indigenous operators in the UNCTAD 40-40-20 regime than in the cabotage regime; giving that the fleet size of the operators in the cabotage regime is higher. This further indicates that the current cabotage regime has not addressed the challenges of foreign domination which the UNCTAD 40-40-20 policy implementation failed to address. Thus, the implementation of the current cabotage regime must be guarded out of the decreasing fleet size pitfalls and low tonnage faced by shippers and operators in the Nigeria maritime industry and which eventually led to the failure of the UNCTAD 40-40-20 policy without achieving the objectives for which it was set up.

5.0 Summary and Conclusion

The study was cast to appraise the UNCTAD 40-40-20 policy implementation and performances in Nigeria in comparison to the current cabotage policy being implemented by the Nigeria maritime Administration and Safety Agency (NIMASA). Thus, the result of the study indicates that the trend line showing the influence of time on the fleet size of the indigenous ship owners is in the cabotage regime is : $Y = 229.93 - 1.7X + e$. This indicates that there is decreasing trend in the fleet size of indigenous ship owners in the cabotage regime. The result of the trend analysis on the fleet size of indigenous ship owners in the UNCTAD 40-40-20 regime also indicates a mean fleet size of 19.818 vessels per annum with a standard deviation of 4.26 over the 11 years period covered in the study. The trend equation showing the relationship between fleet size and time over the period is $Y = 27.02 - 1.20 + e$. This equally indicates a decreasing trend in fleet ownership by Nigeria over the period. The comparative analysis between the indigenous tonnages in the cabotage and UNCTAD 40-40-20 regimes reveals that the mean tonnages of the indigenous ship owners per annum in the cabotage and UNCTAD 40-40-20 regimes are 229477.2145tons and 279286.3636 respectively with respective standard deviations of 92574.10890 and 52471.99601 over the 11 years period covered in the study. The result of the analysis shows a difference in means of -49809.14909 in favour of the indigenous tonnage in the UNCTAD 40-40-20 regime.

The fleet size of indigenous ship owners in both in the UNCTAD 40-40-20 regime and the cabotage regime shows a decreasing trend. This implies a similarity in the manner of implementation of both policies. It suggests a manner of implementation which seems not to understand the need to guard the cabotage regime out of the pitfalls that ensured that UNCTAD 40-40-20 policy did not achieve the core objectives of its implementation in Nigeria. Though differences exist between the fleet sizes by indigenous ship owners in each regime in favour of the cabotage regime; the difference in the tonnage capacity of the operators however favours the UNCTAD 40-40-20 regime, which implies that the cabotage regime has low tonnage capacity vessels as compared to the capacity of the vessels in the UNCTAD 40-40-20 regime.

5.3 Recommendations.

The Nigeria Maritime Administration and Safety Agency (NIMASA) should be guided by the direction of growth of the fleet size and tonnage capacity of indigenous ship owners in the implementation of the current cabotage regime in order to prevent it from witnessing the nature of failure suffered by the UNCTAD 40-40-20 implementation in Nigeria.

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Cite this article:

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