

The Impact of the National Police Service (NPS) on Security Sector Reforms in South Sudan: A Case Study on the Ministry of Interior in South Sudan

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Abstract

The study's objective is to "examine the impact of South Sudan's National Police Service (SSNPS) on security sector reforms a case study of the Ministry of Interior." An empirical inquiry was looked at, and the study was developed as a case study. The researcher used questionnaires, interviews, and observation as the main data-gathering methods. There were 80 people there in total during the research, and 60 were randomly selected as the sample size. For the purpose of this study, descriptive statistics were generated by data analysis using SPSS version 20.0 (Statistical Package for Social Sciences). The data collection process employed both secondary and primary sources. The secondary responsibility was to evaluate already published works, such as books, essays, periodicals, journals, newspapers, and websites. The main methods for gathering data were questionnaires, observations, and interviews, and secondary data was also employed. The national police force of South Sudan has reportedly been able to successfully carry out the duties outlined in the SSNP Act 2011. The National Police Service must overcome a number of significant challenges before it can implement security sector reforms at the Ministry of Interior in South Sudan, according to the report, including the lack of excitement among police officers. The study analyzed published works and data collected through questionnaires, revealing that South Sudan's national police force successfully fulfils duties under the SSNP Act 2011 due to the Ministry of Interior's security sector reforms. However, challenges like lack of officer enthusiasm remain. Since 2005, South Sudan's security sector has faced challenges due to inadequate police training programs and low professionalization. Since independence in 2011, the sector has been characterized by brutality and political instability, impacting the nation's development.



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
1. Introduction

Impact of South Sudan's National Police Service on Security Sector Changes South Sudanese populations usually see improvements to the security sector as essential to the development of effective, democratic institutions, political stability, and the nation's economy. As South Sudan, a country plagued by social and political disruption, has demonstrated, these reforms typically fall short of expectations. South Sudan's security sector reforms fell short of expectations, highlighting both their failure and the National Police Service's (NPS) control over such reforms. The South Sudan National Police Service, established in 2005 after a 30-year rule, faces challenges due to insecurity, inadequate communication, and a lack of equipment and infrastructure. Residents resort to self-defense or enacting their own laws for protection. Despite widespread instability, the service faces challenges in carrying out its duties. It is believed that it often finds out about incidents after it is too late due to a lack of adequate communication tools. In addition to instability, inadequate infrastructure and equipment are contributing to the difficulty of police operations in efficiently managing and safeguarding the nation's residents and their property. For instance, when people don't feel sufficiently protected, they frequently turn to illegal activity or other defensive measures. In terms of post-conflict peacebuilding and state transformation development, the Security Sector Reform (SSR) is a relatively recent concept. Security thought has been influenced by the ideas of democratising societies, human security, peacefully transforming societies, effective governance with accountability and transparency, and poverty reduction initiatives (UNDP 1994; Commission on Human Security 2003; Ball et al. 2003). Though this isn't always the case, the idea of human security—that is, the security of the political elite—is idealised as a counterpoint to the people-centered idea of state security. According to Born et al. (2003), conceptual shifts in the security discussion have predominantly occurred in emerging nations, with a lesser degree in transitional ones. By implementing institutional reforms, the Security Sector Reform seeks to address security issues and make things better. Peace and security are seen as public goods. A higher level of security is advantageous to both society and its constituents. Reforming the security sector is a wide idea that includes improving security through more effective use of limited resources. It aims to coordinate the participation of players in development, security, military, and diplomacy. In order to provide security for the benefit of the populace, democratic, civilian control over the security forces is essential. Decision-making in a democratic setting must be open and accountable. Therefore, there needs to be public involvement. But increased security is not a given with democracy. Given that democratisation challenges entrenched advantages and creates political expectations that are not always met, it is likely no accident that it has been so frequently linked to an increase in political violence (Luckham 2003). Therefore, the foundation of the security sector's reform is in the establishment of institutions that can offer security as well as efficient civilian control mechanisms (Ball et al. 2003, 268). Since Clare Short, the UK's Secretary of State for International Development at the time, first introduced the idea of security sector reform to a broader audience in a speech in London in 1998, the idea has grown in popularity (Short 1999; Ball 1998). Its appeal stems from its visionary integration of multiple objectives under one intellectual roof, including arms control agendas, security-relevant development, donor activities in conflict prevention and post-conflict situations, arms reduction agendas, and the implementation of security sector reforms by governments in developing nations like South Sudan. It also improves the efficiency and effectiveness of governance over those institutions tasked with providing security (Brzoska 2003). 2011 saw the independence of South Sudan following years of civil war and armed conflict. Similar to other parts of post-colonial Africa, there was a strong feeling of hope and optimism for better life. Conversely, within a year of gaining independence, the nation was plunged back into civil war, which in turn sparked other waves of civil wars and threats before new conflicts broke out. South Sudan has not had

political stability since December 15, 2013, instead experiencing constant crises [Mamdani, 2016:6–9; De waal, 2014:7–13]. Due to its location, cultural variety, and shared political past with the Republic of Sudan, South Sudan is facing a number of new security threats. Long-lasting war and bloodshed have plagued South Sudan, frequently having a negative impact on the lives of many. In unstable security situations, many communities find it difficult to develop resilience by having access to basic healthcare, food, and water. The South Sudan National Police Service's major goal is to maintain proper management of a professional police force that provides protection and safeguards the properties of the general public throughout South Sudan. However, as a result of the conflicts between 2013 and 2016, the prosecution office of the South Sudan National Police Service and the judiciary are underfunded and lack experienced people. In the current context, attorneys are also having trouble organising and getting certified. The obvious cause is that under Khartoum's common law system, South Sudan's legal system was mostly based on Sharia and Arabic, with little or no English spoken. This is an additional barrier to the advancement of criminal justice establishments, as certain judges and court employees are limited to operating in Arabic. Reforming the security sector, often known as reforming the security systems, is a well-known "buzzword" among the international donor community. The goal of the study is to make the ineffective and poorly regulated security sector into an effective framework, minimizing the possibility of conflict, and promoting peace, stability, and human rights. The study assesses the influence of the National Police Service on South Sudan's security sector improvements. With a focus on the idea of dependable and accountable security forces, this study evaluates the National Police Service's influence on reforms in the security sector in South Sudan.

Conceptual Framework

This study uses conceptual framework to outline potential causes of action and present a preferred approach to a phenomenon, illustrated and diagrammatically presented.



Explanation of Conceptual Framework:

The National Police Service, acting as an emergency response service, influences security sector reforms by ensuring civilian safety and reducing crime rates. However, environmental

conditions, governmental policies, and lack of motivation can also act as intervening variables, highlighting the relationship between independent and dependent variables.

Literature Review

2.1. Introduction

This chapter discusses the challenges faced by South Sudan's National Police Service (SSNPS) in maintaining internal security, including large defections and the absorption of former militia members, and the ongoing training scandals involving abuse and sexual violence. The police also contend with a culture of lawlessness, extensive drug use, and favoritism in promotions. It is necessary to define the army's and the police's roles more precisely. In donor initiatives to address comparable challenges in the Army, the police have been demoted to a lower priority. According to the United Nations, the phrase "security sector" refers to a broad range of organisations, structures, and individuals that are in charge of managing, providing, and supervising security in a nation (United Nations, 2012). The term "security sector reforms" refers to the change of state security systems, encompassing security sector policies, institutions, roles, responsibilities, and practises of security actors from previous systems to current ones that operate independently under civil authority and are more in line with democratic norms, human rights, and good governance principles (Plantev, 2009). It can include establishments and groups created to address dangers to a state's and its people's security from the outside or the inside. The intelligence community, national and municipal law enforcement agencies, border, customs, and coast guards are all included in the security sector, along with military and paramilitary units (Banerjee, 2009). Although they are distinct concepts, security sector transformation and reforms are frequently used synonymously. A fundamental change in the way security is carried out, Security Sector Transformation (SST) is the pursuit of a governance agenda that centres security planning and provision around the needs of the people. With input from a wide range of stakeholders and role players, the UN approaches SST as a comprehensive change to the security sector that aims to shift the sector's power relations in the direction of civil constitutional control. It also aims to improve operational effectiveness and resource utilisation in line with accountability and respect for human rights and international law, as well as to fundamentally alter institutional culture (Ebo, 2010). The term reform implies a makeover and revolution; transformation goes deeper than that. Contributing to the realisation of societies with secure living circumstances, equitable access to opportunity, health, and happiness, which support a transformed society, should be the ultimate purpose of policing (Chismas, 2012). The political dimension of democratic and civilian control, the economic dimension of appropriate resource allocation, the social dimension of ensuring citizens' security, and the institutional dimension of professionalising the various actors are the four dimensions that a comprehensive concept of Security Sector Reforms (SSR) addresses (Brzoska 2000; Wulf 2000, 19–23).

The Political Dimension: The democratic civilian monitoring of the security sector troops constitutes the political dimension. Good governance, which includes the ability of civil society (such as the media, NGOs, scholars, and the general public) to promote discussion on security objectives and civilian control of the security forces, is the primary goal of reform in this field.

The Economic Dimension: The distribution of resources is the economic dimension. For the security sector to operate effectively, human, financial, and material resources must be allocated rationally. Sustaining an overly robust security apparatus results in an ineffective security sector and a shortage of resources for other initiatives, such as sustainable development. However, the population's security cannot be guaranteed by a security sector that is underfunded. Here, reform entails defining needs and important goals, figuring out

what's affordable, setting priorities for resource allocation, and making sure resources are used effectively and efficiently.

The social dimension: The only true guarantee of public safety is stability. The primary duty of the security sector and its players is to ensure the population's safety both inside and outside the country. Security is not the same as military-provided state-sponsored security. Rather, it refers to defending the whole public against attacks on their lives, health, or property of any kind.

The Institutional Dimension: The institutional dimension consists of the institutional division of the different forces and organisations as well as the organisational structure of the security sector. The various forces will only be effective and accountable if the various institutional tasks are well defined. There is an institutional overlap between foreign defence and internal public security that raises the possibility of military intervention in internal affairs. The idea of a security sector should not be used as a rationale for arming law enforcement or assigning the armed forces a major internal function. These four dimensions highlight how broadly Security Sector Reforms (SSR) can be understood if they are viewed as a governance and democratising programme, as well as a development and security programme, rather than just being narrowly perceived as the technical or institutional reform of the security or the security/justice sector. The literature has made it very clear that Security Sector Reforms (SSR) are a relatively new area for development cooperation; historically, development cooperation shied away from getting too close involved with security actors and left this to the agencies tasked with issues of territorial defence, particularly military assistance and police assistance programmes.

Local Ownership: A key component of Security Sector Reforms (SSR), local actors must define and direct the reform process. This idea has been acknowledged in the literature and is required by donors in order for the reform to be sustained. Instead of seeking local support for their own programmes and projects that were established by funders, external players should support local actors' efforts, according to the Security Sector Reforms programming's local ownership approach. However, there are occasions when putting the idea into practise might be challenging. Local ownership appears to be vital for Security Sector Reforms for two reasons: (1) to advance the democratisation process and (2) as a means of achieving more efficient justice, security, and governance (Nathan 2008; Scheye 2008). Justice and security must be considered "scarce commodities and public goods" (Scheye 2008, 63) in post-authoritarian, post-conflict, and fragile states and societies with high rates of criminality. This applies to how and to whom these services are provided, as well as the goals they are meant to accomplish. Issues that extend beyond the community's traditional authorities are reported to the South Sudan Police Service (SSPS). To "provide law and order in the community," is what is required of the police. Here, "law and order" refers to conflicts both within and between communities. "With any problem you can go to the police because everything needs to be brought to the police," is a common belief in many communities. However, the scope of problems the police can handle is constrained. For example, police are frequently called in to report cattle theft; but, when the number of cattle seized exceeds 100, "they cannot do anything." Many communities understand the rationale behind reporting security concerns to the police, but they also understand the inherent limits of a tiny, ill-equipped force. For example, in Jonglei, "there is no confidence in the police because when they come, the raiders have already left because the police don't have cars and communication (108)". The high median age of police forces—many of them are retired SPLA troops too elderly to fight—contributes to the general lack of faith people have in law enforcement. The fact that "the police are from the same tribe as the raiders, they will have contact with them and do not come until the raiders are gone (109)" is another factor that fuels resentment towards the police. These observations are consistent with survey results that show that "many respondents remain

unconvinced of the capacity and efficacy of the police, even though the majority of respondents say they would report insecurities to the police" (Lokuji, Abatneh and Wani, 2009: 6).

2.2 Theoretical Review

2.2.1 Theory of Change

The 1990s saw the emergence of the phrase "Theory of Change." At the time, it was meant to help with some of the issues that arose when evaluators attempted to gauge the effectiveness of intricate social development initiatives. These included vague presumptions, a lack of understanding of how change processes transpired, and a lack of focus on the series of adjustments required to achieve long-term objectives (O'Flynn 2012). Since then, theory of change thinking has advanced quickly and gained popularity. The term "on-going process of discussion-based analysis and learning that produces powerful insights to support programme design, strategy, implementation, evaluation, and impact assessment" (Vogel 2012, p5) describes Theory of Change. These insights are communicated through narratives and diagrams that are updated repeatedly. A theory of change is sometimes presented as a hybrid of a narrative summary and a graphic, and it can also be thought of as a product. Theories of Change can be implemented at the programme, project, or organisational levels. They can be created and applied in a variety of ways for various objectives. They do, however, provide for a shared knowledge of how change occurs and an organization's or program's own role in bringing about change, which makes them possibly most helpful for complex organisations and programmes involving several partners (see James 2011). Organisational theories of change can vary significantly in terms of how they are developed and how they appear in the end. Still, a number of theories of change have certain things in common.

Identifying how change happens: Analysing the influences that could influence any intended results is typically necessary when developing a theory of change (Jones 2010). Therefore, determining how change might occur in regard to a certain issue is typically the first step. This can involve evaluating whether external context elements could support or obstruct change, who can favourably or adversely affect change, what or who needs to change, at what levels (e.g., national, regional, and community), and for how long. The evaluation might be predicated on shared perceptions of how change occurs amongst the various parties creating the Theory of Change. In certain situations, studies may be commissioned to produce new knowledge and findings regarding the processes through which change occurs in a certain setting. It's also possible to apply methodologies like gender, stakeholder, or power analysis. Furthermore, a consensus might be reached by using the results of previous assessments carried out by others that were comparable. **Recognising your own position:** The next step aims to specifically identify an organization's or program's contribution to change, even though the analysis of how change occurs typically does not address an organization's own intervention. This stage's primary goal is to determine which improvements an organisation and its partners can directly or indirectly contribute to, as well as which ones are outside the purview of their efforts. Recognise how change occurs in the environments in which you operate and what part you specifically play in bringing about these changes. Create a conceptual roadmap that shows how your work will influence the changes that have been identified.

2.3 Impact of Security Sector Reforms

2.3.1 Security Sector Reform

While not the primary subject of the report, the information gathered offers other perspectives on SSR initiatives. These are particularly related to the ability and willingness of the police and SPLA to provide security, as well as other forms of "policing" or neighbourhood security measures like "home guards." As was evident from the previously mentioned insights, progress and disarmament require the supply of sufficient security. South Sudan's security sector

development is still in its early stages and will undoubtedly be a challenging and drawn-out process. Since "the Southern army is not a unitary actor but rather a heterogeneous collection of soldiers from a wide range of ethnic groups with different histories, experiences, and understandings of the civil war," the SPLA cannot currently be regarded as a capable security provider (Mc Evoy & LeBrun, 2010: 30). Several SPLA generals have deserted and voiced dissent, making this painfully evident. Moreover, the army is becoming more and more top-heavy as a result of the promotion of several militia commanders in order to keep their allegiance. It was also reported in one interview that SPLA currently boasts more than 200 generals. The percentage of people who are illiterate is very high; 90% of officers and 80% of ranks cannot read or write (Rands, 2010: 25). "Usually the literate rule the illiterate, but here in South Sudan it is the opposite," a state official jokingly said. No preparations were made for linking Security Sector Reforms (SSR) or DDR to plans for the post-conflict growth of the civilian security services (police, prisons, and wildlife) or the judicial system, according to Safer World (2008: 10–11). Though nothing has been done to really execute the reforms that have been conceptualised for the security sector in South Sudan. As was mentioned in the last chapter, the Southern Sudan Police Service (SSPS) is undertrained and underdeployed, and the state judiciary is hardly operating at all. There is still very little vetting because most police officers are recruits from the Sudan People Liberation Army (SPLA). Additionally, 90% of police officers lack literacy, which makes even the most fundamental police duties difficult (Lokuji, Abatneh, and Wani, 2009). Additionally, even while young recruits are being trained, many of their commanding officers' disinterest in providing security hinders their desire and ability to operate. Communities do, however, claim that young recruits are also involved in criminal activity. Thus, the question of how the police are accountable to the people of South Sudan continues to be a crucial one that needs to be appropriately handled. A good example of the varied viewpoints that different parties have on the responsibilities of security providers is the "community policing" argument. In Sudan, community policing is commonly understood to refer to either an armed youth force defending the community or a civilian police force that supports the police. Some emphasise that it ought to be seen as a policing tactic, whereby law enforcement engages the community in conversation to enhance security measures. Chiefs engage with young men in their community to protect the security of both the community and its borders, as they frequently live in relative lack of state services. Although it is acknowledged that this approach has the potential to backfire, a number of state officials voiced a wish to employ this conventional method of security organisation in light of the state actors' apparent lack of security provision. There is also variation in the methods used to set up these community security systems; some advocate arming these "home guards," while others would rather keep them unarmed and provide them with minimal training and uniforms. It's interesting to note that the police in Kapoeta, where they were allegedly outgunned by citizens, had implemented "community policing as a policy." This entailed "entering cautiously, interacting with the populace, and attempting to identify solutions for the security issues." Thus, it appears feasible to use community security as a police tactic in Sudan as opposed to arming young people.

2.3.2 Security Promotion

The 2005 CPA, which expressly asks for the "proportional downsizing of forces on both sides," serves as the foundation for DDR in Sudan (GoS & SPLA/M, 2005: VI, 1c). Other Armed Groups (OAGs) were to be integrated into the Sudan Army Force (SAF) or the Sudan People Liberation Army (SPLA), or they were to enter DDR. Troops of the SAF and the SPLA were to redeploy to their respective sides along the 1956 border. Joint Integrated Units (JIUs) were to be formed combining forces from both sides in preparation for a possible unified Sudan. The creation of a National DDR Coordination Council (NDDRCC), which manages the operations of the Southern

Sudan DDR Commission (SSDDRC) and the Northern Sudan DDR Commission (NSRRDDC), was also mandated by the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA). It is thus the responsibility of these commissioners to plan, carry out, and oversee the DDR initiatives in their respective areas. The Multi-Year DDR Programme (MYDDRP) took the role of the Interim DDR Programme (IDDRP) in June 2008. The United Nations Population Fund (UNFPF), UNICEF, the World Food Programme (WFP), and the UN Advance Mission in Sudan (UNAMIS) are among the organisations that receive international assistance through the Integrated UN DDR (IUNDDR) Unit (Nichols, 2010: 10). Human security was a major priority for the IDDRP (Saferworld, 2008: 8), and its objective was to turn former fighters into contributing members of society rather than just placate potential spoilers (Nichols, 2010: 13; Gebrehiwot, 2009: 43). The "suggestion that ex-combatants who reintegrate act as economic 'catalysts' for their communities appears overly optimistic," but in reality, the IDDRP has adopted an individual approach to reintegration instead of the community-based approach that was initially envisioned (Brethfeld, 2010: 10). Currently under revision, the DDR programme in the South will be implemented upon independence.

2.4 Challenges faced by National Police Service on the Security Sector Reforms

These obstacles are keeping the South Sudan National Police Service (SSNPS) from efficiently carrying out its purpose. Due to its inadequate communication capabilities, it frequently learns about threats after it is too late. The issue of police work being more difficult to do is not limited to a lack of equipment and infrastructure; inadequate or nonexistent training also plays a role. Because they don't feel sufficiently protected, the populace frequently turns to illegal activity or other defensive strategies.

2.4.1 Community Disarmament

Between December 2005 and May 2006, Jonglei saw the first civilian disarmament effort following the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA). When Lou and Gawaar Nuer pastoralists asked the Dinka Hol and Nyarweng from Duk County for permission to graze cattle on their lands in December 2005, things got complicated because the State (and mainly Dinka) authorities demanded that the Nuer give up their weapons before they could graze their cattle. (Young, 2007a: 34; Small Arms Survey, 2007a: 3). Because they were afraid of being left defenceless, the Nuer were reluctant to give up their weapons. As a result, during battles with the Sudan People Liberation Army (SPLA), the Nuer "white army" lost heavy casualties and withdrew northward, robbing people in the process. As part of the disarmament drive, the Sudan People Liberation Army (SPLA) stole supplies and cattle from the locals as they were not provided with regular sustenance. An estimated 3,300 firearms were gathered during the campaign, and 213 civilians, 400 members of the Sudan People Liberation Army (SPLA), and 1,200 white army soldiers were slain (Young, 2007a: 2-6; Small Arms Survey, 2007a: 4). A small UN contingent developed a voluntary disarmament campaign in Akobo and Pibor in 2006 and 2007, in response to this aggressive campaign, working with local government and Sudan People Liberation Army (SPLA) administrations. During this effort, more than 2,500 weapons were gathered without resulting in casualties. The UNDP launched the Community Security and Arms Control (CSAC) programme in an effort to address the issue of SALW in civilian hands in a more positive way. A Government of South Sudan (GoSS) CSAC Bureau was established in 2006. In addition to managing community security and arms control in South Sudan, the CSAC bureau is also responsible for liaising with foreign colleagues regarding the UN Plan of Action on SALW, Nairobi Protocol, and other related matters. Violence, or the threat of violence, was nevertheless employed when the Sudan People Liberation Army (SPLA) saw fit. According to O'Brien (2009), "the coercive aspect of the campaign circumscribed the scope of the UN's contribution" in the 2008 disarmament campaign. For instance, two communities in Hiyala

Payam, Iloli and Oguruny, in Eastern Equatoria State (EES), where ad hoc disarming had started in 2007, rebelled. Following the deaths of eight troops and eleven civilians, the Sudan People Liberation Army (SPLA) set fire to the two villages, forcing 4,300 people to escape (Mc Envoy & Murray, 2008: 33). Depending on the motivation of local leaders of the Sudan People Liberation Army (SPLA) and Government of South Sudan (GoSS), the extent of disarmament efforts varies significantly between states. While Eastern Equatoria State (EES) has postponed further disarmament, the majority of actions have been carried out in Jonglei. Because of the threat posed by the Lord Resistant Army (LRA), no civilian disarmament efforts were made in Western Equatoria State (WES), and no firearms were gathered or registered. Ultimately, there is little to no indication that the disarmament operations had any effect on the overall number of small arms and light weapons (SALW) in South Sudan, and there may have been none at all on the level of armed violence among civilians in the region (O'Brien, 2009: 11).

2.4.2. Cattle Raiding

It is not surprising that the traditional method of maintaining cattle is viewed as a feasible choice in areas with little agricultural potential and formal economic operations. The people's culture is heavily influenced by cows. Cows have come to be associated with life, and people often settle disputes and marry in cows. Even more so than the lives of humans, cows' lives are now valued highly. There are security hazards for the local community in South Sudan because of the value of cows in dowries, the ability to win respect from peers by robbing cows, the traditional cultural practice of robbing cows as a transition into manhood, and recurring conflicts between pastoralists and farmers. The dowry system is exceedingly expensive and increases livestock theft among cattlemen or pastoralists because dowries can be as much as 25 to 200 heads of cattle. This implies that "when I do not kill somebody from another village, they will think I am a woman" for a lot of young pastoralists. Pastoralist tribes, particularly those in the Kapoeta region, view being unmarried as meaningless, and men are under pressure to obtain the dowry required for marriage. The mindset of many young people talked about cow raiding is as straightforward as "if I succeed, I'll marry and eat the rest, and if I fail, I die." Essentially, it quickly devolves into a cycle of both robbing cows and being robbed by others. "People are frequently killed in cattle raids because they are followed after the cattle are raided." Aside from the scarcity of economic options and occasionally the thrill-seeking tendencies of teenagers, the cultural aspect of cattle raiding is deeply embedded in South Sudanese society. Even after learning about the detrimental effects of the dowry system, highly educated and sensitive women from a Torit women's collective insisted that "it is a matter of prestige, as when you get married with a lot of cattle your husband is a hero because he was able to raid so many cows." Additionally, it was shown in interviews that younger members of the pastoralist communities believed it was their opportunity to show their bravery by robbing cows, while elders in the community viewed the cyclical violence that accompanied cattle raiding as a bad thing. It is crucial to remember that pastoralists are not the only people living in South Sudan. The majority of South Sudanese living outside of cities, however, will eventually deal with livestock. In his analysis of cattle raiding in Eastern Africa, Muiruri John Kimani (2010) of the International Space Station discovered that politicians and security service employees are among the dependents of this problem, making it more difficult to tackle and intractable. During this investigation, anecdotal information from South Sudan was used to discover this phenomena. Some people might consider cattle raiding to be one of the internal causes of war. Nonetheless, what IKV Pax Christi asserts regarding the Karamajong in Uganda may also apply to South Sudan. "The reactive nature of conflict is the most significant causation in conflict that is disregarded. Contrary to what the picture of the "root" suggests, this causality is "circular," not "linear" (IKV Pax Christi and SOPA; 2011). Violence appears to be more often caused by the perceived need for vengeance after a raid than by a "inescapable need" to raid

cows. Removing the weapons employed in these cycles of violence and retaliation won't be enough to break this pattern.

2.4.3 Insecurity through Poverty

Due to the difficulty of using agriculture as a substitute for cattle rustling due to natural conditions, poverty and food insecurity are closely related to it, as is general insecurity. Food insecurity is easily caused by physical insecurity, as evidenced by the fact that "people in Akobo last year were unable to cultivate due to attacks from the Murle who came to raid cattle." "People don't have enough to eat" is a common occurrence caused by extreme poverty and food insecurity. They will raid someone else if they are seen to have an abundance of cows. When compared to the monetary value of their cows, though, pastoralists are typically considered to be relatively wealthy. In this sense, poverty has less to do with financial hardship and more to do with the restricted options available to them. It is evident that there is a mutually reinforcing relationship between poverty, underdevelopment, and security in South Sudan. Insecurity is fueled by a circumstance where there are generally few accessible routes, limited communication options, and little interaction between the local populace and security providers due to a lack of development. In turn, a lack of security makes it challenging to create infrastructure, establish social contracts outside of one's immediate community, and establish alternate food sources.

2.4.4 Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) Availability

Due to the fact that "gun possession became a means to sustain people's livelihoods," the widespread availability of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) enhances the violence that goes along with providing food for families. Hunting, robbery, and livestock rustling all include the use of weapons. Research from this study as well as the Small Arms Survey from 2007 revealed that South Sudanese citizens buy and/or keep guns for a variety of reasons, including self-defense, retaliation attacks, the possibility of cross-border insecurity, and anticipated disarmament benefits. Since there are no official or sufficient security measures in place in many parts of South Sudan, the use of guns or the threat of them got entwined with the cultural practise of livestock raiding. It was also a means of power acquisition. In short, "here [in South Sudan], the power of the gun is overwhelming." Because "they will shoot the wives when they talk bad about them," the proliferation of firearms also reduces the distance between annoyance and lethal violence. The availability of SALW facilitates the escalation of small disputes and debates into lethal violence, which during our investigation seemed to be a regular occurrence in South Sudan. But the fact that gun violence and cattle raiding predated the introduction of firearms to South Sudan should serve as a caution against seeing disarmament as the only way to address these issues.

2.4.5 Disenfranchised Youth

The youth are one of the biggest threats to the security of South Sudan. In Southern Sudan, youths under 20 accounted for 54.9% of the total population in 2010. Young people are frequently faced with destitution, maybe a violent culture, and a lack of job and educational opportunities. Because they have "not enough facilities to keep them busy, they are idle and get up to bad things," adolescents are frequently the origins of instability in cities like Torit. The so-called "Niggaz" in Sudanese cities are another oddity. Originally referring to a speech, music, and dress style that was imported by returnees from the United States of America and was popularised in Juba and other Sudanese cities, it has come to be associated with the anti-social and criminal actions of some marginalised youth who embraced this style (Leonardi, 2010: 60). These are "thugs that rape people on the street and then do nothing when the police are called." We therefore feel really uneasy. In general, young people are dissatisfied with their lack of

influence; for example, "there are no youth in parliament, only women." Thus, disenfranchised youth in South Sudan come in a variety of ways. They will be a major danger to internal stability and the social fabric required for conflict resilience if we don't engage them in more positive activities. In particular, taking into account the backdrop of poverty and the scarcity of options.

2.4.6 External Threats

In addition to these primarily internal security concerns, other security issues that respondents referred to as external threats also exist. As previously indicated, there are several rumours of the North acting as a proxy force and inciting violence in the South, which contribute to the destabilising factor in the region. However, it is unknown how severe this problem is. Foreign nomadic tribes are a major source of concern for many South Sudanese. "Insecurity is brought here by clans who come from outside our area. These are people as well, but their character makes that they bring violence. They do not have the same character as the people here." The LRA incursions represent a specific external security threat to WES. "They are foreigners. They were proxy force of SAF, to fight the SPLA. They were supplied from Juba and Torit. They had nowhere to stay after the CPA, so they went back to the bush, now in DC and CAR." Last but not least, in numerous interviews, the SALW and munitions that can pass via South Sudan's numerous porous borders were brought up as an external threat.

2.4.7 Gendered Perspective on Security

There are clear distinctions between the ways in which men and women experience insecurity, despite the fact that certain woman-maintained security circumstances are same for both genders. It is reported that women are a particular target "because they are not armed." And those who come to abduct children target women to take their children. They also rape women and they cannot rape the men. And they know the men can fight back but the women are weak." Conversely, men bear the responsibility of safeguarding the family and, in doing so, put themselves at risk. An apt illustration would be the Arrow Boys, who, according to hearsay, are exclusively made up of guys. Nonetheless, women are assigned certain household tasks outside the home due to the historical divide between men and women. In Budi (EES) for example "they rely typically on natural resources in the bush; firewood, grass, farming, water. When nobody is escorting you, you have to go alone." Beyond the obvious pain and suffering in the body and mind, rape has numerous aftereffects. "Due to pressure from society people even commit suicide because of it. The society is still at the traditional state. The society says this is a damaged person, so people then feel useless and kill themselves." Finally, a lot of women experience insecurity at home. "We are not secured internally (family level, at family level they can beat you), also from men inside. You have to keep your mouth shut to survive."

2.4.8 Seasonal Insecurity and Times of Insecurity

It was evident from the studies that insecurity and the seasons and time of day are closely related. Cattle keepers begin searching for greenery and water during the dry season for their cows, which can lead to conflicts with other pastoralist groups and agricultural groups that span state and national borders. In addition to providing much-needed water, the rainy season offers denser foliage, which groups such as the LRA in WES employ to travel undetected. When the rainy season arrives in WES, this phenomena causes a generalised fear of the LRA. Thus, the seasons are a part of the cyclical violence that has plagued South Sudan in the past and will do so for the foreseeable future until there is intercommunal engagement and targeted action by the GOSS. The nighttime veil that criminal organisations and outsiders exploit to travel undetected distorts the community's sense of security both at night and during the day. Beyond these particular security risks, a violent past has left behind numerous more repercussions. It is possible to classify the current militarised environment with its high

trauma levels as a culture of violence. Since "bringing somebody who has been in war to peace takes a bit of time, it's like smoking; you don't stop just like that," significant and targeted action from the government and civil society is desperately needed. However, changing this culture and reducing trauma will take time. This ought to serve as a clear caution against the elevated standards both within and outside of the South Sudanese context. Since reciprocal trust takes time and positive experiences to develop, the social compact that is necessary for conflict resilience will take time to establish.

2.5 Role of National Police Service on Security Sector Reforms

2.5.1 Political and Institutional Obstacles

The success of interventions is hampered by a number of basic political and institutional barriers in addition to the unique problems associated with security-promoting activities. One well-known problem is the UN bureaucracy, which one state official called "very nasty." Activities were delayed as a result of the cash being available but not being released. In one instance, the projectors that were supposed to go with the PCs took a year to arrive, even though the computers were bought nine months ago. Although Sudanese own the programmes and bureaus that get donor support in theory, in reality, they do not really spend the funds. It causes delays and frustrations even though it might prevent corruption on the part of GOSS and even though there might not be a readily available substitute. The inability of programmes to adapt to changing circumstances and the post-conflict context is another institutional issue. Although the need for this kind of flexibility is understood, in actuality it presents greater challenges. One possible solution to this would be to incorporate pertinent indications into the way programmes are implemented. The relationships between DPKO and UNDP management were likewise problematic. The DDR process in Sudan is generally perceived as having not accomplished as much as was initially envisaged, even if on paper the programme served as a model for the integration of the several UN agencies participating (Saferworld, 2008: 2). Nichols (2010: 20) attributes the difficulty of cooperation to "institutional uncertainties, combined with clashing personalities." Disagreements included whether or not to apply previously decided CSAC components, how to support the national DDR Commissions, and what kind of reintegration help to provide. Regulations from UNDP and DPKO that limited direct line management by employees from another agency made matters worse. "UNDDP computers in Juba are not allowed to access UNMIS networks, and phone connections between UNDDR Unit offices located on separate UNMIS and UNDP premises are not allowed" (Saferworld, 2008: 22–23). One such criticism of the DDR programme relates to the improper handling of funds. According to a November 2010 audit of the SSDDRC, financial accounting is deficient and top staff is abusing control (PwC, 2010). A UNDP representative criticised the commission for recruiting relatives and pointed out its unethical behaviour. However, UNDP is charged with comparable mishandling. Much of the funds designated for reintegration support "have been spent on office equipment, staff vehicles, and international salaries, many of which were never originally approved," according to an internal UNDP memo provided to the New York Times. In addition, UN officials neglected to disclose purchases totaling more than \$450,000 US dollars, and according to Kron (2010), "the project's 2009 annual report failed to mention that not a single former combatant had completed the reintegration programme." Donors have indicated that they will not be ready to grant additional cash until the issues have been clarified and have required answers to a specific set of questions regarding expenditures (Nichols, 2010: 23). It is obvious that the back-and-forth charges have damaged workplace relationships. However, there is more to the lack of financial accountability than only the DDR program's issues. Other critics bemoaned the fact that funders continue to support corrupt regimes. Donors continue to provide funds without conducting extensive expenditure audits, even though they are aware that corruption keeps

the majority of donations from reaching the most vulnerable populations. "Money is only frozen in a country when it greatly increases the insecurity of others." Donors frequently give priority to quick repairs out of a concern of losing money if the work isn't part of a longer process. International and Sudanese humanitarian workers stress the value of volunteering, particularly during times of conflict and ethnic unrest. Some have questioned the true goals of donor interventions due to the lack of longer time frames and the donors' inability to address fundamental concerns in the democratisation process. One expert on Sudan painted what may be considered a dire picture, saying that donors prioritise trade and stability over democracy. Mark Duffield has made similar observations (2001; 2007). Even in cases when actions are not solely driven by commercial interests, the short time horizons discourage attention to the more complex issues surrounding democratisation, the long-term effects of which could not become apparent. Thus, it comes down to security and technical problems. The warriors have been trained and equipped, but what does that bring? Improve your ability to kill, torture, and shoot people.

2.5.2 Local Security Perspectives

It is crucial to evaluate what security can mean at the local level in the South Sudanese context before focusing on certain regions and security-related issues. Even though the official conclusion of the war with the North occurred in 2005, security is not a given in South Sudan. For example, residents of WES even assert that they felt safer during the conflict because "there was only SPLA, who might have wanted some food." Those that are violent would survive, but they would never leave you alive. There is no denying that South Sudan's pervasive insecurity is dynamic, intricate, and extremely context-specific. However, similar factors like poverty, a culture and economy dependent on cattle, external threats like the LRA and foreign pastoralists, and the prevalence of SALW in a highly traumatised and militarised environment with sizable populations of disenfranchised youth are also frequently linked to insecurity. Security has a major role in South Sudan's social and economic growth. Stated differently, "security encompasses everything" and "you can't do or go anywhere without security." You feel as though your hands are bound behind your back. The realisation that security can range from the internal "something within yourself" to the externally globalised idea that "security is for everybody; not only the security of South Sudan but also the United States and other countries: this is the security we want to live in" comes from candid conversations about what security actually means. Notably, a large number of respondents reported having a variety of security-related problems. "When you live freely, move freely, speak freely, and nobody interferes with your life," "a situation with no war but peace and stability as security is the stabilisation of the situation," and "economic growth in the country" are some examples of the overall sense of security. The ideas of "security also means your children are going to school, you have facilities" and "a road to move freely to the market without fear at any time, even at night" are two examples of more specific concerns related to security. Among others is food security, which is frequently associated with a lack of physical security. In WES, seasonal variations affected food security. "The rainy season is approaching, and people are afraid to go outside [to cultivate the land],"²⁶ referring to the fact that the LRA can move around undetected during this time by hiding behind thicker greenery. The idea that food insecurity is both a result of inadequate physical security and a source of insecurity at the community level is given credence in Eastern Equatoria State (EES), where "some areas we fear to cultivate because of mines" contribute to food insecurity. The idea that "men with guns" who were insecure began to include "also police and soldiers in [the] market because if anything happens they start shooting," which is a concerning phenomena in some locations. This is in line with other research showing that, both during and after the conflict, "many rank-and-file and senior SPLA officers have been involved in human rights violations, abuse of power, and corruption,

even though SPLA soldiers are largely viewed as war heroes who liberated South Sudan" (Lokuji, Abatneh and Wani, 2009: 10). Despite the widespread belief that "people are the reason why there are problems and violence," some interviewees appeared to be sceptical about the possibility that South Sudanese would use violence against one another for personal benefit or vengeance alone. It is a commonly held belief that "innocent communities fighting themselves are instigated by others [Khartoum]." Others, on the other hand, contend that while the North "doesn't have the capacity to cause these things, they just exacerbate," they are "probably involved by exacerbating." It is evident that certain situations are not solely limited to South Sudan. Furthermore, security companies are not always the answer—sometimes they are a contributing factor. But security providers can only deal with the consequences of the myriad disputes that arise within South Sudanese society. Stated differently, resolving these disputes entails more than just using security companies that operate expertly.

3. Research Methodology

The study, which focused on research methodology, sampling area, design, study sample, and sampling procedures, was carried out at the Ministry of Interior Police Service in South Sudan. Data collection methods, instrument, questionnaire, interviews, data analysis plan, data collection procedure, data analysis and interpretation, document review checklist, quality control, validity, instrument validity, data collection procedure, data collection methods and techniques, and data analysis and interpretation are all included in this study. We will computerise and process the data using the statistical analysis programme SPSS. The data were described using a number of tables, graphs, including bar graphs, and narrative annotations. compiled using percentages and tables After that, the data will be coded and entered into The Statistical Package SPSS, a computer programme, to facilitate simple analysis and result interpretation. Descriptive statistics will be utilised to examine primary data, and SPSS software will be used to study primary data through frequency analysis. The questions are related to information regarding the viewpoints and experiences of the participants regarding the phenomenon being studied (police performance in crime prevention and control), as Leady and Ormord (2005) advise.

Table 3. Sampling procedure showing population and sample size distribution

| Category of Employees | Population | Sample Size | Sampling Procedures |
|---|------------|-------------|------------------------|
| Directorate of police staff | 20 | 18 | Simple Random sampling |
| Directorate of criminal investigation staff | 25 | 20 | Simple Random sampling |
| Directorate of operation staff | 20 | 6 | Simple Random sampling |
| Directorate of administration and finance staff | 10 | 10 | Simple Random sampling |
| Department Inspector of police general | 1 | 1 | Purposive sampling |
| Department of legal affairs staff | 4 | 4 | Simple Random sampling |
| Total | 80 | 60 | |

Presentation, Discussion and Interpretation of Findings

4.1. Introduction

Instrument return rates, demographic information on respondents, and conclusions linked to each research issue were covered along with the study's findings as they were presented, analysed, and interpreted.

4.2 Rate of Return of Instruments

Table 4.1: Rate of Return of Research Instruments

| Sample size | | Rate of Response | | Missing | |
|-------------|---|------------------|-----|---------|---|
| F | % | F | % | F | % |
| 60 | | 60 | 100 | 0 | 0 |

Source: Primary data, September, 2023

The table of analysis indicates that a total of 80 questionnaires were sent out to respondents who were chosen at random. The table above shows that 60 of the distributed 60 questionnaires were completed and returned. A response rate of 65% is deemed enough by Kothari (2010) to continue the study.

4.3.1. Gender of Participants

| Gender | Frequency | percentage |
|--------|-----------|------------|
| Female | 23 | 38.33 |
| Male | 37 | 61.67 |
| Total | 60 | 100.00 |

Source: Primary data, September, 2023

According to the results shown in the table above, 62% of participants were men, while 38% were women. According to the aforementioned results, men made up the majority of participants. That indicates that men dominated this study.




Figure 4.3 1: Gender of Participants, source: primary data, August, 2023

4.3.2 The Age of Participants

According to data provided, age distribution of participants is distributed as shown in figure 4.3.2 below:




Figure 4.3 2: The Age of Participants

According to figure 4.2 above, results indicate that 53% participants are between the ages of 20-35, followed by 33% participants who are between the ages of 35-45, then comes 12% participants who are between 45-55 years old, then comes 7% participants who are 45 years or above it, and the remaining 1% participants who are 55 years and above. The findings show that different age groups participated in the study, and the majority of respondents are youth

in their twenties and thirties. It means that those youths joined their jobs earlier and had work experience.

4.3 Marital Status of Participants

The distribution of marital status of participants was as shown in figure 4.3.3 below:




Figure 4.3: Marital Status of Participants; Source: Primary Data, 2023

The findings from figure 4.3 above indicate that 58% participants are married, 40% participants are single, and 1.7% of participants are widowed. The above results show that majority of respondents are married responsible people. Meaning that married people are more occupied in upbringing of family members such as children and others.

4.3.4 Education of Participants

The distribution of educational level of participants is as shown in figure 4.3.4 below:




Figure 4.4: Education of Participants; Source: primary data, 2023

The findings indicate that 48% participants hold bachelor degrees, 25% participants hold holds postgraduate degrees, 12% participants hold diplomas, and 7% participants are secondary school graduates. The findings indicate that majority of participants are holding bachelor degrees. It means participants are empowered and know their duties in place of work.

4.5. Work Experience of Participants


The distribution of working experience of participants is as shown in table 4.3.6 below: According to the results from table 4.3.6, 42% of participants had worked for their respective

institution for one to five years, 38% had worked for six to ten years, 12% had worked for less than a year, and the remaining 8% had worked for more than eleven years.

| Experience | Frequency | Percent |
|--------------------|-----------|---------|
| Less than a year | 7 | 11.67 |
| 1 – 5 years | 25 | 41.67 |
| 6 – 10 years | 23 | 38.33 |
| More than 11 years | 5 | 8.33 |
| Total | 60 | 100.00 |

Source: primary data, 2023

The results indicate that the majority of participants were employees who had been working for between one and five years, indicating that the questionnaires were filled out by workers with at least five years of experience. In other words, it denotes that the staff members were aware of their roles and obligations.



4.6. The Effects of Security Sector

Table 4.6. Illustrates the impact of National Police Service

| STATEMENT/SCALE | SA | | A | | U | | D | | SD | | TOTAL | |
|---|----|----|----|----|---|---|---|----|----|----|-------|-----|
| | F | % | F | % | F | % | F | % | F | % | F | % |
| Presence of national police service and security sector reform in Ministry of Interior led to a decrease in crime rates | 33 | 55 | 10 | 20 | 4 | 8 | 8 | 16 | 5 | 10 | 60 | 100 |
| National police service and security in the Ministry of Interior ensures safety to the civil populations across the country | 30 | 50 | 22 | 44 | 2 | 4 | 1 | 2 | 4 | 8 | 60 | 100 |
| National police service and security in the Ministry of Interior has led to effective performance of police mandate as stipulated in the SSNP Act 2011 in South Sudan | 34 | 57 | 18 | 36 | 3 | 6 | 2 | 4 | 3 | 6 | 60 | 100 |

Results in table 4.6 above shows that 55% or 33 participants strongly agreed with the statement that presence of national police service and security sector reform in Ministry of Interior led to a decrease in crime rates, 20% or 10 participants agreed with statement above, 16% or 8 participants disagreed with the statement, 10% or 5 participants strongly disagreed with the statement, and 8% or 4 participants were uncertain about the truth of the statement above. In the second statement, 50% or 30 participants strongly agreed with the statement that national police service and security in the Ministry of Interior ensures safety to the civil

populations across the country, 44% or 22 participants agreed with statement above, 8% or 4 participants strongly disagreed with the statement, 4% or two participants are uncertain about the truth of the statement above, and 2% or one participant disagreed with the statement. In the third statement, 57% or 34 participants strongly agreed with the statement that national police service and security in the Ministry of Interior has led to effective performance of police mandate as stipulated in the SSNP Act 2011 in South Sudan, 36% or 18 participants agreed with statement above, 6% or 3 participants strongly disagreed with the statement, it means that they do not acknowledge whether there is relationship between impact of NPS and security reform in the Ministry of Interior, another 6% or 3 participants were uncertain about the truth of the statement above, and 4% or two participants disagreed with the statement. Results as per table 4.4.1 discussed above indicates that 57% is the highest percentage, it is therefore it is concluded that national police service and security in the Ministry of Interior has led to effective performance of police mandate as stipulated in the SSNP Act 2011 in South Sudan.

4.7. The National Police Service has faced challenges in implementing security sector reforms at the Interior Ministry.

Table 4.7: The National Police Service has faced challenges in implementing security sector reforms at the Interior Ministry

| STATEMENT/SCALE | SA | | A | | N | | D | | SD | | TOTAL | |
|---|----|------|----|------|---|-----|---|------|----|------|-------|-------|
| | F | % | F | % | F | % | F | % | F | % | F | % |
| The National Police Service faces challenges in implementing security sector reforms in the Ministry of Interior due to inadequate equipment and training. | 35 | 58.3 | 18 | 36.0 | 4 | 6.7 | 8 | 16.0 | 5 | 10.0 | 60.0 | 100.0 |
| The National Police Service faces challenges in implementing security sector reforms at the Interior Ministry due to inadequate infrastructure, inaccessible highways, and widespread unlawful gun ownership. | 33 | 55.0 | 20 | 40.0 | 2 | 4.0 | 1 | 2.0 | 4 | 8.0 | 60.0 | 100.0 |
| The South Sudan National Police Service is facing challenges in navigating the security sector changes at the Interior Ministry due to a lack of motivation among officers. | 38 | 63.0 | 14 | 28.0 | 3 | 6.0 | 2 | 4.0 | 3 | 6.0 | 60.0 | 100.0 |

Source: Primary data, 2023

According to table 4.7 above, 58% or 35 participants strongly agreed with the statement that lack of motivation to police personnel is also a challenge faced by National Police Service on the security sector reforms in the Ministry of Interior, 36% or 18 participants agreed with the statement above, 10% or 5 participants strongly disagreed with the statement, 8% or 4 participants were unsure about the truth of the statement above, and 16% or 8 participants disagreed with the statement. In the second statement, 55% or 33 participants strongly agreed with the statement that poor infrastructure such as inaccessibility of roads within and outside the cities and illegal possession of arms in the hands of citizens across the country are major challenge faced by National Police Service on the security sector reforms in the Ministry of Interior, 40% or 20 participants agreed with statement above, 8% or 4 participants strongly disagreed with the statement, 4% or two participants were uncertain about the truth of the statement above, and 2% or one participant disagreed with the statement. In the third statement, 63% or 38 participants strongly agreed with the statement that lack of motivation to police personnel is also a challenge faced by National Police Service on the security sector reforms in the in the Ministry of Interior, 28% or 14 participants agreed with statement above, 6% or 3 participants strongly disagreed with the statement, another 6% or 3 participants were

uncertain about the truth of the statement above, and 4% or two participants disagreed with the statement. According to results in table 4.4.2 above, 58% being the highest percentage; therefore, it is concluded that lack of motivation to police personnel is main challenge faced by National Police Service on the security sector reforms in the in the Ministry of Interior. It therefore means that promising and ensuring motivation in terms of salaries, allowances, bonuses and health insurance would mean that National Police Service had played major role to reform security sector in the Ministry of Interior.

4.8. Roles of National Police Service on Security Sector Reforms in the Ministry of Interior

Table 4.8: Showing the Roles of National Police Service on Security Sector Reforms in the Ministry of Interior

| STATEMENT/SCALE | SA | | A | | N | | D | | SD | | TOTAL | |
|--|----|----|----|----|---|---|---|----|----|----|-------|-----|
| | F | % | F | % | F | % | F | % | F | % | F | % |
| Safeguard people's lives and their properties is a major role of National Police Service on security sector reforms in the Ministry of Interior | 37 | 62 | 8 | 16 | 4 | 8 | 8 | 16 | 5 | 10 | 60 | 100 |
| Maintaining professionalism and efficiency of the police in keeping the law and order in the country is another role of National Police Service on security sector reforms in the Ministry of Interior | 33 | 55 | 20 | 40 | 2 | 4 | 1 | 2 | 4 | 8 | 60 | 100 |
| Investigating the crimes committed by individuals and keep the records is also a role of National Police Service on security sector reforms in the Ministry of Interior | 34 | 56 | 18 | 36 | 3 | 6 | 2 | 4 | 3 | 6 | 60 | 100 |

Source: Primary data, 2023

According to table 4.8 above 62% or 37 participants strongly agreed with the statement that safeguard people's lives and their properties is a major role of National Police Service on security sector reforms in the Ministry of Interior, 16% or 8 participants agreed with the statement above 10% or 5 participants strongly disagreed with the statement, 8% or 4 participants were uncertain about the truth of the statement above, and 16% or 8 participants disagreed with the statement. In the second statement, 55% or 33 participants strongly agreed with the statement that maintaining professionalism and efficiency of the police in keeping the law and order in the country is another role of National Police Service on security sector reforms in the Ministry of Interior, 40% or 20 participants agreed with statement above, 8% or 4 participants strongly disagreed with the statement, 4% or two participants were uncertain about the truth of the statement above, and 2% or one participant disagreed with the statement. In the third statement, 56% or 34 participants strongly agreed with the statement that investigating the crimes committed by individuals and keep the records is also a role of National Police Service on security sector reforms in the Ministry of Interior, 36% or 18 participants agreed with statement above, 6% or 3 participants strongly disagreed with the statement, another 6% or 3 participants were uncertain about the truth of the statement above, and 4% or two participant disagreed with the statement. According to results in table 4.4.3 above 62% is the highest percentage, therefore safeguard people's lives and their properties is a major role of National Police Service on security sector reforms in the Ministry of Interior. This means if national police service safeguard people's lives and their properties, it would mean that security sector reforms in the Ministry of Interior is in a right place to play that major role.

Summary, Conclusion and Recommendations

5.1. Summary of Research Findings

This study investigates the influence of South Sudan's National Police Service on security sector changes, identifying unsatisfactory outcomes and advocating for significant improvements in police practices, budgetary assistance, infrastructure, and public-police interactions based on a variety of viewpoints. Focus groups and in-depth interviews were the main methods utilised to gather data from the field and enhance the data for the current study (Kitzinger, 1995). The study investigates the influence of the National Police Service on security sector reforms in South Sudan, utilizing a case study design and questionnaires with a 60-participant sample. In order to provide descriptive statistics for this study, data were analyzed using SPSS version 20.0 (Statistical Package for Social Sciences). Data for the study were gathered using both quantitative and qualitative methods. The process of gathering the data included both primary and secondary sources. A secondary responsibility was to review the already published materials, such as books, articles, periodicals, journals, newspapers, and websites. The main source consists of surveys. Initially, primary data was used, and then secondary data was added. Both quantitative and qualitative techniques were used to collect data for the study. The process of gathering the data included both primary and secondary sources. A secondary responsibility was to review the already published materials, such as books, articles, periodicals, journals, newspapers, and websites. The main source consists of surveys. Primary data was presented first, and then supplementary data was added. The study reveals that the National Police Service and Security in the Ministry of Interior effectively fulfills the police mandate outlined in the SSNP Act 2011 in South Sudan. The study reveals that the National Police Service faces challenges in implementing security sector reforms in the Ministry of Interior due to lack of motivation among police personnel. The study reveals that the sociopolitical system in South Sudan hinders effective police functioning, leading to widespread unemployment and a high rate of crime among physically fit men, making it challenging for the police to effectively prevent and control crime. The results of the in-depth interview also revealed that the National Police Service (NPS) had a greater impact on South Sudan's security sector changes than the police alone were able to handle. The research makes it very evident that creating various paramilitary formations to assist the police in deterring and suppressing crime is not going to be a solution to the problems.

5.2. Conclusion

According to the analysis, South Sudan's National Police Service and Security has made it possible for the police mandate as stated in the SSNP Act 2011 to be efficiently carried out. The survey also found that police personnel' lack of passion is the National Police Service's biggest barrier to security sector changes at the Ministry of Interior. Finally, it was made apparent that the National Police Service, which safeguards people's lives and property, plays a vital role in the security sector developments in the Interior Ministry. The article analyzes the South Sudan police Security Sector Reform program, a post-war rehabilitation effort with international support, concluding that the initiative should be owned and run by the South Sudanese police, and coordination among international actors is crucial. The South Sudanese police Security Sector Reform program should focus on enhancing oversight abilities of legislature, judiciary, and civil society organizations, rather than retraining and restructuring formal security institutions due to national capability issues. Serious efforts are being made by the government and donors to implement the reform program's four major goals: enhancing democratic control over security institutions; professionalizing the security forces; bolstering the rule of law; and improving the capacity of civil institutions for efficient oversight. strengthening of security forces to ensure their capacity to uphold peace in South Sudan's regions, states, and counties,

an improvement in the working conditions of security forces personnel, and serious initiatives to advance good governance.

5.3. Recommendations

The study recommends based on the findings of 60 participants' responses to random questionnaires, based on the information obtained from the questionnaires. The National Police Service (NPS) in South Sudan has institutionalized checkpoints for collecting money, turning them into toll gates for commercial vehicles. According to studies, preserving the momentum for change, getting rid of circumstances that expose police officers to corruption, and limiting exposure where corruption risks are unavoidable can all help to significantly reduce police corruption. Police officers are currently exposed to corruption; in cases where exposure to corruption hazards cannot be avoided, exposure should be controlled (Igbinoia, 1982; Karimu & Osunyikanmi, 2012). Additional actions should be taken to help the National Police Service (NPS) improve in relation to the Security Sector Reforms in South Sudan, such as getting rid of some road block functions, putting in place effective transformational leadership, and recruiting qualified personnel investigations. The South Sudan National Police Service must train police officers in investigation methods and public relations tactics to raise crime victims' satisfaction levels. Interventions influence the actions of investigation officers, resulting in more arrests and a more ferocious response to crime. It is possible to improve public opinion while also overhauling the police force. Raising compensation, introducing reform-related incentives, establishing a centralized information system, enhancing service delivery, and working with other organizations are all things that the National Police Service must do. The researcher suggested areas for improvement in the South Sudanese security sector reform. Increasing and solidifying the security forces' technological and professional skills. ii. Addressing the issue of the proliferation of small guns in the communities iii. Securing the country's adherence to human rights. iv. Providing law enforcement with training on how to respond quickly to domestic abuse incidents.

5.4. Areas for further Studies

- i. The Effect of South Sudan's National Police Service (NPS) on Security Sector Reforms
- ii. An assessment of the security sector's leadership on the country's stability in South Sudan
- iii. The Security Sector's Role to the Promotion of Democratic Government in South Sudan

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
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Appendix (I): Map of the Study Area



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