

The roles of South Sudan Government in the Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration of Ex-combatants: A case of South Sudan Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Commission

Wilson Lual Lual Malong

Abstract

To access the roles of South Sudan Government in the DDR Program implementation and Security Sector Reform, to examine the roles of a nation state in the implementation of DDR according to international system and to access the political will of the country's leadership toward DDR program. This study employed both quantitative and qualitative design, which involved both secondary and Primary data, questionnaires and interview as the tools used to collect the data from the field for being readily available methods and easy to administered. A sample size of 378 respondents was drawn from a population of 1,000,000 ex-combatants descriptive and analyses were carried out, Statistical Package of Social Science (SPSS 16.0) software and Advance Excel were significance for this study. The results of analysis were presented by tables, graphs and charts for easy interpretation and discussion. The challenges of the study include lack of political will to implement CPA-Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration, created a donor fatigue and anxiety to fund the current R-ARCSS demanded DDR program, hence placed a big deadlock on the implementation. It was therefore recommended that the government should lead and fund the program, create an enabling environment, which will attract the external and internal support, and make the program attractive to liberation ex-combatants who are expecting very high dividend. Further, it was recommended that successful Reintegration, Demobilization and Disarmament of Ex-Combatants will bring a sustainable peace, stabilize security and boost economic development which will lead to general prosperity and political stability in South Sudan.



IJSB

Accepted 25 September 2022
Published 30 September 2022
DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.7127494

Keywords: *Disarmament, Demobilization, Reintegration of Ex-combatants, R-ARCSS.*

About Author (s)

Wilson Lual Lual Malong, BBA MANCOSSA, PGDBA, MBA and Master Degree in Security from University of Juba South Sudan, South Sudan.

Introduction

South Sudan is located in East Africa it gains her independent from former one Sudan since 2011 after 21 years of liberation war since 1983 however, Government of South Sudan has gone through episodes of three different Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) programs and Security Sector Reforms (SSR) from 1972 until 2020, with the aim to achieve post-conflict sustainable peace, security and development. First of which was the absorption of Anya-nya forces into the Sudanese security and defense sector, brought about by the Addis Ababa Peace Agreement mediated by All African Conference of Churches, where Southern Sudan Liberation Movement Forces were absorbed into the Sudanese army and Police. Out of these forces, 60,000 was to make part of 12,000 Officers and Men who will be the army of Southern Sudan autonomous government of High Executive Council. Comprehensive Peace Agreement-ordered Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration program (CPA-DDR 2005-2011) fall second in sequence. This initiative was made possible by the 2005 peace accord that the Sudanese government and the Southern rebels of the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army reached in Nairobi, the capital of Kenya, to end their 21-year conflict. It was centrally managed by presidency in Khartoum and implemented by Governments of Southern Sudan (GoSS) in the South and Northern Sudan in the North led by two separate commissions respectively. The program had to be separated and re-designed as a result of South Sudan becoming an independent state in 2011, making the third program (2011-2014), halted in 2014 due to war outbreak within South Sudan's SPLM leadership in 2013. The fourth is the upcoming, reformed DDR program (2015-2023), demanded by the revived R-ARCSS, which was signed in 2018 in Addis Abeba, the capital of Ethiopia, following violence in J1 Palace between Vice President Dr. Riek Machar's and President Salva Kiir's body guards once more in 2016. In accordance with this Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (R-ARCSS), which was mediated by IGAD through Khartoum and signed in Addis Abeba in 2018, all combatant armed forces were to be combined into a single national army, and the remainder were to be subjected to a respectable DDR program. Out of this, all the rest of three attempts were regarded as failed DDR programs by previous researchers. Poor treatment of Anya Nya1 former fighters, neglect of economic development in the south and lack of political will by Khartoum regime to implement the Addis Ababa Agreement failed the deal. The consequences of failed DDR contributed significantly to the failure of Addis Ababa Agreement, clash of presidential body guards in 2013, igniting the war between the SPLM leaders, JI clash by forces loyal to Dr. Machar and President Kiir in 2016. Because the SPLA army was not professional, it was bloated and operating along ethnic lines without military doctrine. All of these have resulted to general economic hardship currently facing the country because of insecurity which is preventing foreign and national investments and discouraging entrepreneurship, hence low production and unemployment. These failures attracted the question of what role did the government of the day play in making sure that such a vital program succeeds. This research will look into the particular role played by the government of Southern Sudan and independent South Sudan in the implementation of the DDR programs, alongside the international community through UN and other bilateral NGOs.

Statement of the problem

The South Sudan entered into the war of freedom with the north in 1955 soon after the failure of Juba conference of 1947 to address the issue of South Sudan self-rule. Attempts to resolve the conflict through Addis Ababa 1972 Peace Agreement that brought back the Anya Nya could not last when President Numeiri abrogated the agreement in 1983. An action that provoked that Southerners to initiate the SPLM/A rebellion which forced the Sudan National Congress Party (NCP) Government to include the self-determination pack in the Comprehensive Peace Agreement signed 2005 in Kenya. Following still the path to freedom, Southerners voted unanimously for secession 99% in a referendum exercise. After then came the question of

governance for the SPLM as ruling party to affect the need to have a working institution that will bring about the security stabilization, which is the cornerstone for development and prosperity of the people. Coming out of the war that has suppress the development for decades in the South, a lot needs to be done to bring together the 64 tribes of Southern Sudan to whom their social fabric has been torn apart by the protracted war of liberation. For example, High illiteracy rate, poor health status, lack of rule of law, weak institutions, no roads, etc. these has over whelmed the autonomic Government of Southern Sudan during the six years interim period of 2005-2011. Instead, the government have been assimilating all the untrained militias into the already guerrilla SPLA to form the national army. The SPLA which is a Country Army at the Moment, was a guerrilla Army, lacked the professionalism, Education Skills, disciplines and military doctrines that is required in National Army of any Modern State. Consequently, DDR program is important to ground the question of Security Sector Reform needed by the Country. This change is intended to support security and stability in post-conflict environments to promote recovery and growth in the context of the world we live in (DDR Commission Document 2014). The overall goal of the DDR program was to increase the stability and prosperity of the nation by assisting the transition of surplus SPLA and National organized forces back into useful civilian life. Initial estimates from the government suggested demobilizing 90,000 ex-combatants from 2005 to 2011 and 150,000 ex-combatants after independence; however, more recent estimates from 2013 to 2014 suggested the actual numbers are in the range of 60,000 to 80,000 ex-combatants (DDR Commission Document 2014); currently, the DDR document estimates 105,000 ex-combatants to leave for civilian life. The existence of non-essential elements, huge parade and ghost names has resulted to lack of accountability and proper transformation of the SPLA into modern Army, ultimately, the Government recognizes that the armed forces need to transition to a more proportionately – sized and resourced National army (SPLA) which respects human rights and operates under effective civilian oversight (DDR Document 2014). In light of these mentioned problems downsizing in force size is needed to modernize the would be national unified army (SSPDF) as well as to reduce the National defense Budget. At the moment the approximate of 40% of the National Budget is consumed by defense expenditures, out of this budget the approximate of 80% goes for Salaries welfare costs. Therefore, the Government's overall interest is served by the military being more efficient. The amount of people who have formal access to firearms should decline as redundant personnel in the defense industry are demobilized and police are given more authority to enforce security and the rule of law. DDR is considered as one element of a larger Security Sector reform process that will greatly contribute to economic development as those carrying weaponry offer a possible source of insecurity in the future if not regulated effectively (DDR Document 2014).

Objectives of the study

To access the roles of South Sudan Government in the DDR Program implementation and Security Sector Reform, to examine the roles of a nation state in the implementation of DDR & SSR according to international system and to access the political will of the country's leadership toward DDR program.

Research Questions

What is the Role of South Sudan Government in the DDR Program implementation and Security Sector Reform? What is the role of a nation state in the implementation of DDR according to international system? And how the political will of the country's leadership affect the outcome of the DDR?


Significance of the study

To avail recommendations that will guide the future role of governments in implementing successful DDR program, to provide the significant research information and Data that will give feedback to government of South Sudan how it has done the past DDR to guide the new DDR implementation, to outline the government shortfalls and limitations to guide the intervention of the well-wishers in terms of funding, to highlight on the roadmap of the Security Sector Reform in South Sudan.

Scope of the study

The scope of the study is to uncover how the government of South Sudan have been fulfilling its obligation in the implementation of DDR program of South Sudan. It will be limited to sampled States, Counties, Payam, Bomas and Villages of South Sudan. The research will touch on ex-combatants, DDR practitioners, community members and civil society to represent the opinion of all.

**1.5 Conceptual Framework
Roles of Government**



Justification of Research

Given the long Civil War that has Necessitated the Mobilization of South Sudanese People in to joining the movement of SPLM/A to fight Khartoum government and, which has pitted also other Southerners against the other and the SPLM/A that led the fight for Liberation against the Arabs in Khartoum, getting that great number out of arms to realize the development becomes a challenge after independence of South Sudan. Many attempts to do a successful DDR has desperately failed in 1982, 2005 and 2011. Evaluations conducted echoed lack of separate role between South Sudan government and the UN as a major factor in the failure. Now that the Country has entered into the new Era of Rehabilitation and Development, this requires an effective institutionalization and institutional transformation, especially on Security Sector as core Value and cornerstones of any Development of infrastructure, Socio-Economic, Healing and Peace Building process. However, doing it over again without addressing the question of distinct roles will be a repetition of failure. This research is therefore set to investigate the role played and recommend how best it should be played in the next program to achieve success. the SPLA in 2006 integrated huge number of Several South Sudanese Militias that were against

the SPLM/A and who were loyal to Khartoum during the war before signing of CPA. These were mostly Civilians, untrained and undisciplined Soldiers without Military Doctrine. Given the Fact that SPLA itself emerged from paramilitary Army, characterized by rules of Jungle, is important to be Transformed into a Modern Army, by downsizing the Parade, removed the non-essential elements and move them into civilian life. Nevertheless, well-planned and implemented DDR program is one most successful way of achieving that purpose.

Literature review

The objective of this article has reviewed all the literatures that are relevant to the topic on study in a more general term. In particular, the chapter reviewed the role played by South Sudan Government during the implementation of (DDR) of ex-combatants into civilian life from 2005 to 2020. It looked back a bit later into the role played by Sudan government in trying to absorb the Anyanya forces into Sudanese defense and security sector and civil sector. A few issues of strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats of two governments in discharging those roles were uncovered. Just for comparisons, the chapter reviewed in the literatures (books, magazines, news articles, newspapers, Journals, archives.) the role played by other post-conflict governments in a similar context world-wide and the African region in particular. The significance of governments' roles in the implementation of ex-combatants' demobilization, reintegration, and disarmament was then emphasized.

The Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) on DDR Program in South Sudan: The Sudanese Peoples Liberation Army/Movement (SPLA/M) and the Government of Sudan (GoS) eventually agreed to the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), which was composed of six protocols: the Machakos Protocol, the Protocol on Power Sharing, the Protocol on Wealth-Sharing, the Protocol on the Resolution of Conflict in the Abyei Area, the Protocol on the Resolution of Conflict in Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile States, and the Agreement on Security Arrangements. The protocol on security arrangements was essential for the reintegration of ex-combatants. To do this, however, the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) and the SPLM/A had to put an end to their hostilities and cooperate in order to bring about peace, harmony, and security in the area, particularly in the contentious border regions between the North and South of Sudan. The Interim National DDR Coordination Council was established in accordance with the protocol to administer the Interim DDR program in Sudan and South Sudan. They emphasized the necessity of the DDR program, but neither the government negotiators nor other parties took the time to pause and think about the particulars of the setting in which such a delicate and intricate program would be put into practice. As a result, a lot of the subsequent measures were unsuccessful. As a result, this Chapter will focus on the issues that prevent the interim DDR program from being implemented successfully as well as its repercussions on the second phase of the DDR program pilot that was undertaken in the Mapel Transitional Facility in Western Bahr El Ghazal State.

Disarmament: "Disarmament is the collection, documentation, control and disposal of small arms, Ammunition, explosives and light and heavy weapons of combatants and often also of the civilian population. Disarmament also includes the development of responsible arms management program" (UNIDDR, 2006). Disarmament is typically viewed as the first stage. Removing explosives, ammunition, and weapons (both light and heavy) from a person is a highly symbolic gesture that denotes the end of that person's active engagement as a warrior.

Demobilization: "Demobilization is the formal and controlled discharge of active combatants from armed forces or other armed groups. The first stage of demobilization may extend from the processing of individual combatants in temporary center to the massing of troops in camps

designated for this purpose (cantonment sites, encampments, assembly areas or barracks or facility) the second stage of demobilization encompasses the support package provided to the demobilized, which is called reinsertion” (IDDRS, 2006).

Reinsertion: Assistance given to former fighters after demobilization but before the more prolonged process of reintegration is known as reinsertion. Reinsertion is a type of transitional aid that can include temporary safety allowances, food, clothing, shelter, medical care, short-term education, training, work, and equipment to enable ex-combatants and their families meet their basic requirements. Reinsertion, which can last up to a year, is a temporary material and/or financial support to satisfy urgent requirements. Reintegration is a long-term, continual social and economic development process (IDDRS, 2006:26).

Reintegration: “Reintegration is the process by which ex-combatants acquire civilian status and gain Sustainable employment and income. Reintegration is essential for social and Economic process with an open time frame, primarily taking place in communities at the local level. It could be a part of the general development of a country as a national Responsibility and often necessitates long-term external assistance (IDDRS, 2006:26).at this phase the individual gets back to his or her civilian status, as well as help in obtaining work so that he / she can have a stable income to support his/her family. Some international organizations and different countries (donor countries) help sometime financially for reintegration projects. Surely, the Ex-combatants are a special group and present challenges because they may pose a potential threat to security, in other hand the stigmatization may be a challenge for the Individual because ex-combatants may be viewed with fear and suspicion when they return. Many of the ex-combatants lack a social network and for these reasons social reintegration must be addressed shortly after they return to their communities. Inclusion into formal and informal social networks such as family reunification, psychosocial support and counseling are therefore important to explore and engage in from the outset.

The United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) DDR: The United Nations Mission in South Sudan, in its mandate of UN Resolution 1996 (2011), mandated the mission to support the activities of the DDR program, under security sector reform in South Sudan. The UN assessed budget under Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO) was slated to take care of the first phase of the DDR process; the Disarmament Profiling, the selection of the demobilization site, the management of demobilization process, distribution of reinsertion kits and the sensitization of the military leadership under the leadership of the DDR Commission. The observation of DDR credibility was part of their responsibility. Although the process is co-chaired by UNMISS DPKO State Senior Officer with National DDR State Senior Officer, the State Coordinator, the technical expertise lands solely on the shoulder of the UNDPKO because they are presumed to be mentoring the National DDR Commission.

The UNDP on DDR program: This is a department within the UNDP that supports the implementation of DDR worldwide. During the conduct of DDR in Sudan before the separation of South Sudan, this department was selected to manage the donor funds for the Sudan DDR. The responsibility of ensuring that funds are used to economically, politically and socially reintegrate ex-combatants back to the communities of return was given to UNDP DDR. During the DDR donor conference in Oslo, it was agreed that the UNDP will mobilize the funding on behalf of the two governments; the Government of Southern Sudan and the Government of Sudan. \$ 165,000,000 amount was pledged and \$ 47,273,320 was received for DDR programs. Out of what was received, only \$ 19,245,709 went to XCs reintegration kits and rest was used

for project overhead by UNDP. This has given the UNDP an extra responsibility of not only reintegrating the ex-combatant but to also manage the funds diligently.

Combatant: The IDDRS Operational Guide defines a combatant in the DDR context according to an analogy with the definition set out in the Third Geneva Convention of 1949, relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War in relation to persons engaged in international armed conflicts. A combatant is a person who is a member of a national army or an irregular military or is actively participating in military activities and hostilities or is involved in recruiting or training military personnel or holds a command or decision-making position within a national army or an armed organization or arrived in a host country carrying arms or in military uniform or as part of a military structure or having arrived in a host country as an ordinary civilian, thereafter assumes, or shows determination to assume, any of the above attributes" (IDDRS, 2006). Guerrilla, soldier, militia, women, Fighter, and children associated with fighting forces, other non-combatant roles such as drivers, cooks, porters, and similar that are all associated with armed groups are all examples of combatants. Combatants may have various connotations, but include a wide range of meanings.

The CPA DDR Reintegration Package Phase: The reintegration package should, ideally, always comprise the following three major components: psychological, social, and economic help. Formal education, vocational training, job development, and self-help livelihood projects should all be a part of the economic reintegration support. Community sensitization, the reconciliation process, life skills, and psychological support should all be a part of social reintegration support. The reinsertion package, which provides help to former soldiers after demobilization while they wait for the comprehensive reintegration package, should come before these. Typically, this is meant to last them for a few months. Agricultural help such as poultry, arable and cattle farming, beekeeping, fisheries, or forestry were available as reintegration package options in the South Sudan Experience. The second choice, business, required training in brick-making, shoe-making, bakery, restaurant management, phone charging and repair, phone "air time" sales, and catering. The third choice was career training, which covered fields like food processing, plumbing, tailoring, welding, and IT. (Africa Leadership Center's Report on South Sudan DDR) The final alternative was an adult literacy education program to assist people who missed school due to the war in obtaining a basic education. Even those who received assistance with demobilization and later a reintegration package did not see significant changes in their lives, supporting the idea that "too little, too late." According to a 2010 assessment by the STHLM policy group, the older SPLA cadres felt that the reintegration package was inadequate and irrelevant to encouraging their development. In addition, the ex-combatants claimed that the pension that would have supported them in old life was not included in their package. Even though the government kept making pension promises, the fact that their counterparts (ex-combatants in Sudan) were receiving them made it a contentious political issue. Most of the ex-combatants acknowledged that they were dissatisfied and disappointed with the reintegration package. The ex-combatants once refused to speak with representatives of the DDR Commission and other organizations, accusing them of neglect, in an effort to express their rage. An ex-combatant allegedly assaulted a member of the Commission staff in a different incident. The trainers countered that one of the barriers to genuine reintegration was ex-combatants' high expectations, lack of engagement, and high levels of illiteracy. According to the Africa Leadership Center report, some former combatants dropped out of the reintegration training because they lost interest, were too old or illiterate to understand the lessons, or had to attend to family responsibilities like looking after their families and dealing with daily issues and the challenges of the economic degradation. In other instances, the former combatants reintegrated themselves after waiting for the eagerly awaited reintegration package.

What is Supposed: Ex-combatants would become more aware of the goals of a reintegration program and, most crucially, what to anticipate from the sponsors if they were sufficiently engaged and sensitized. They should also be instructed in conflict resolution techniques for reintegration, and local agents should have received training to speak on behalf of DDR officials at lower levels during program follow-ups. Additionally, challenges, expectations, and worries relevant to the context would have been covered. A vibrant community might quickly comprehend the DDR package for former fighters and collect more funds locally. Furthermore, community mobilization through local leaders was required in South Sudan's rural villages since they carry information household to family, which was not the case during the first phase of DDR. Local mobilizers who have received training are more likely to succeed in changing perceptions in their communities when they are supported and given responsibility for community sensitizations. They share meals, drinks, and daily life with them, and most importantly, they get to know their communities' perspectives better. Local communities would sense ownership of the DDR program rather than considering it to be a foreign-imposed program since local mobilizers are easily trusted and listened to. As was previously indicated, residents of rural places were unable to participate in reintegration. It would have benefited from discussions with DDR officials, community forums where pressing issues like the stigma associated with female ex-combatants could be handled, local security, and reconciliation. The success of the DDR program depends on the local communities' capacity to pardon the ex-combatants and accept them as full members, but this does not appear to have been completely grasped or consistently taken into account in the South Sudan DDR program. Additionally, local observers and development experts contend that the policy of reintegrating specific ex-combatants rather than the suffering returnees as a whole and the host communities is seen as discriminatory because some returnees in the host communities actually have a worse economic situation than specific ex-combatants. The approach is said to be mostly unsustainable because it does not provide the community as a whole any authority. Even the most defenseless elements of the population, such as the disabled, received little assistance in South Sudan; instead, the Special Needs Groups (SNGs) associated with the armed forces were the focus of the DDR program. It is common for individuals of vulnerable communities to think they are entitled to gain from any local government initiatives. The individual approach was therefore considered to be discriminatory.

The Effect of the Economic Challenges on CPA DDR Implementation: Given their role in the liberation war, ex-combatants from various states were particularly anxious to get state benefits, just like any other stakeholders in the nation. According to a common belief among ex-combatants, "time for suffering had finished and now it is time to reward" (Africa Leadership Center's Report). The high expectations of the People meant that most of them were unaware that the fledgling government had the means to address all of their requirements.

Inclusion, Participation and Individualized Approach: The DDR, a unique component of reintegration, strives to individually meet the needs of ex-combatants and their companions. Thus, beneficiary participation is crucial to the success of any community activity, including the DDR Program. Although such projects and programs may occasionally be started from the top, the design and implementation should be heavily influenced by the ideas and suggestions provided by the grassroots. Local residents are more familiar with seasonal changes, the locations of the closest water catchments, and other particular difficulties that are specific to their area. De-miners were able to identify high-risk regions for de-mining in Afghanistan, for instance, by consulting with the local communities (Africa Leadership Center's Report). By the end of the program, ex-combatants who took part had also learned crucial abilities for independence. The majority of scholars on DDR Field agreed with the claims that the biggest

error made by foreign community workers was to presume they knew it all and ignore the opinions of the afflicted people. Therefore, any attempt to minimize the value of local expertise and contributions renders the DDR program as a whole ineffective and suggests that it was created for purposes beyond from the restructuring of the security sector. The national government always has the best understanding of how they want to prioritize things; they are aware of what should come last. Instead of teachers, they need facilitators who can help them make better decisions (Report from Africa Leadership Center). There was a general perception in the South Sudan CPA DDR Program that the host communities, including their leaders, were not fully engaged in all reintegration activities, and that concrete sensitization about the DDR Program was not introduced as much as possible. This factor led to misconceptions and unreasonably high expectations among the beneficiaries. The only activities in which the local administration were involved were radio announcements (over UN-owned Radio Miraya), which furthermore only reached Radio device owners. In the end, a large number of ex-combatants lost out, primarily because of a lack of information, transportation issues, and other reporting difficulties. A vibrant community might quickly comprehend the DDR package for former fighters and collect more funds locally. The Local Caseworker and SPLA Moral Orientation were trained to facilitate and entrusted with community sensitization; as a result, they were trusted to deliver information household to household, which was not the case during the first phase of DDR. As a result, they are most likely to change the perceptions of their Colleagues and communities. Community mobilization through local leaders was also necessary in South Sudan's remote villages because they deliver information household to household. They share meals, drinks, and daily life with them, and most importantly, they get to know their coworkers' perspectives better. Because mobilizers are easily trusted and taken seriously, the SPLA will sense ownership of the DDR program rather than viewing it as a foreignly imposed or harmful program designed to harm the Ex-Combatants. As was previously indicated, ex-combatants who lived in rural places were unable to interact with DDR officials. Additionally, the Community forums where pressing concerns like the stigmatization of female ex-combatants, neighborhood security, and reconciliation could be discussed would have been beneficial. The success of the DDR program depends on the local communities' capacity to pardon the ex-combatants and accept them as full members (Report from the Africa Leadership Center), but this does not appear to have been fully understood or systematically taken into account in the South Sudan DDR program.

The Nature of DDR's Implementation Environment: DDR program implementation necessitates a favorable economic and security climate, which isn't always the case. Muggah contends that the conclusion of all-encompassing peace treaties does not always imply the restoration of peace. He contends that conditions following an armed conflict are typically harsh and can pose a greater threat to civilian security than the actual battle itself. The major warring groups engaged in serious allegations and counter-accusations during the interim period in which the CPA was intended to be implemented, which frequently resulted in armed clashes. This was largely related to the outstanding border problems that the CPA neglected to address. The South Sudanese administration also had to deal with serious internal security issues. The DDR program was severely hampered by the ethnic tensions, particularly in Jonglei state, which were brought on by livestock and land rustling. According to a research from the Africa Leadership Center, various armed militias led by politicians and opportunistic army officers also posed a challenge to the state's exclusive right to use force. The government of South Sudan was therefore focused with thwarting Sudan's invasion and other significant internal security issues rather than concentrating on DDR and other important developmental programs. IDPs were forced to leave Sudan's bombardments more frequently as a result of the

ensuing humanitarian catastrophe, particularly in the fiercely contested border regions. The disarmament exercise was put on hold in 2009 due to excessive stress.

False Assumptions in CPA DDR : According to the report from Africa Leadership, the evidence suggests that the DDR program was carried out hastily without performing a sufficient baseline study that would expose the difficulties and expectations of ex-combatants during the CPA DDR Program and inform practitioners on who, what, how, and when the best course of action should be taken to appropriately address the specific needs of various communities and Ex-Combatants on the same ground. As a result, several inferences were drawn. For instance, the CPA DDR Program's designers made the grave mistake of assuming that former fighters would have easy access to land, which was not the case. Given the nation's low population density, a quick glance at the millions of empty parcels of land would lead some observers to believe it has idle land. Additionally, it was presumed that ex-combatants would happily return to their country, despite the fact that the majority of them were actually not interested in living there due to the appalling living conditions, which included depressing medical services, impassable roads, a lack of water, physical insecurity, and food insecurity, to name a few. However, those ex-combatants who chose to remain in towns experienced a lot of the same difficulties. Another dangerous presumption was that the welcoming villages would give the former combatants land and integrate them, but this was not the case, according to a Report from the Africa Leadership Center. There was a significant gap between demobilization and reintegration; only 6,546 of the 12,525 combatants who were demobilized received the reintegration package. If CPA-DDR program designers and implementers had conducted a feasibility study, they might have discovered all this and possibly taken the right course of action.

The most essential CPA-DDR activities and Challenges faced by Program: The report from Stockholm Policy Group on CPA- DDR experience in South Sudan captures the essence activities that has taken place during CPA-DDR program and dilemma faced by Several respective processes as follows: -

The Activities of Disarmament, Demobilization and Re-integration in CPA DDR Program:
Disarmament: According to the CPA Agreement, the DDR does not include the real disarmament. In actuality, the word shouldn't have included the first "D" of the DDR in South Sudan. The SPLA should make sure that soldiers only show up for demobilization. The SPLA has already disarmed the warriors at the time of pre-registration, and the weapons are still in its possession. Because of this, the DDR Commission only has a partial understanding of how the actual disarmament proceeds and where the weapons have disappeared. Only the soldiers who have turned in their weapons are noted on the discharge certificates, and as a result, in the Disarmament, Reintegration, and Arms Management System (DREAM). At the time of the evaluation, the system showed that 4,557 weapons had been turned in (in Juba and Rumbek), indicating that 52% of the combatants who had been demobilized (apart from women who had served in the military, or WAAF) had done so. People no longer possess firearms once they report for the UNMIS-led portion of the process. As a result, we are also unable to infer if the demobilization has any effect on the availability and regulation of firearms in the nation. It is reasonable to suppose that SPLA armories house weapons that are safer than those held by individual soldiers. The most crucial issues, however, centered on whether or not demobilized troops had always stayed unarmed. Phase I's goal number for demobilization is 36,641, with the Special Needs Group being included (SNG). As Phase two, around 53,400 SPLA active-duty personnel were to be demobilized. Much less progress than expected has been made so far. According to the information published by UNDP (as at December 2, 2010).

Demobilization (Registration, eligibility criteria and verification): Beginning in Mangala in Central Equatoria State (2,116 combatants between 10 June and 31 August 2009), Rumbek in the Lakes States (3,675 combatants between 23 October 2009 and 14 May 2010), and Aweil in Northern Bahr El Ghazal State, the demobilization of combatants in Southern Sudan was phased in over the following three years (2,844 combatants – 7 July to 29 September 2010). In Torit, Eastern Equatoria State, demobilization was in progress at the time of the Review Mission. It began on October 14th, 2010, but was again suspended owing to eligibility concerns. Demobilization began in Wau, Western Bahr El Ghazal State, on November 9. As of now, 9,736 former combatants and WAAF have been demobilized, as stated in Table 1. This demonstrates unequivocally that demobilization has occurred significantly less than anticipated. Only 26% of the SNG target (Phase One) and 11% of the original southern Sudan goal have been demobilized, respectively. Furthermore, 10% of the demobilized were WAAF, who were getting the same benefits as the ex-fighters but were not combatants. It is noteworthy that the SPLA has freed more than 3,000 kids since 2005 outside of the DDR program that is the subject of this research. UNICEF has helped 500 kids since 2008. As a number of fighters were reinstated on the SPLA payroll following their demobilization, it should be realized that in some cases the demobilization has really been reversed. This would raise doubts about the accuracy (or applicability) of the statistics mentioned above. In fact, it calls into doubt the efficacy and feasibility of the entire DDR initiative during the CPA Era. The DDR assistance program is structured so that it begins with a list that is created by the SPLA at the state level. The list is cross-referenced and verified against the SPLA payroll. The list is then sent to the SSDDRC for review and approval before being sent on to UNMIS. When a person is demobilized, UNMISS will arrive with this master list to make sure they are not missing anyone from it.

Comprehensive Peace Agreement CPA on DDR Program 2005: The following implementation issues for the CPA DDR program have been identified based on a report issued by the Stockholm Policy Group on December 30, 2010: The Government of Southern Sudan thinks that it was never included in the planning for the DDR program. The strategy is not really suitable for the circumstances in southern Sudan. Lack of sufficient funding lines for SSDDRC to support operational and planning operations linked to the DDR program's implementation. The SSDDRC employees frequently considered themselves to be merely bystanders in a GoSS program. The UNDP and SSDDRC were expected to "co-manage" the program's implementation. However, "co-management" is not truly present in UNDP implementation mechanisms. The DDR program's reintegration support was being directly carried out by UNDP. Therefore, IPs have also been subcontracted by UNDP. Funds from the DDR program were being funneled into UNDP entities for the program's operationalization and implementation. Early on, there were significant gaps between the SPLA and the actual DDR help offered. The SPLA eventually reinstated ex-combatants to its payroll after feeling that the "packages" were insufficient. It seems that the SPLA disagreed with the idea that all SPLA members, whether they were recent OAG members or old veterans of the war, received the same perks and services under the DDR program. The DDR Program under the UNDP was titled "Multiple Practices and Misappropriation of Funds," and the failure to account for USD\$ 450,000 was clear proof of corruption. Meanwhile, a sizable budget was used for administrative costs, while beneficiaries only received a comparatively little amount.

Lessons Learned from the CPA-DDR Program (2005-2012)

Overall, the program produced mixed outcomes and fell short of helping to reduce the size of the military; it also did not integrate well into the larger recovery strategy, which included community security, social cohesion, reconstruction, and adherence to the rule of law and human rights. The mixed results of the Southern Sudan CPA-DDR (2005-2012) program was

attributed to several factors, including: contextual complexities—war-ravaged economy, poor infrastructure vis-à-vis expansive territory, and other structural issues such as political mistrust. The program was also affected by an initial false start of the demobilization of non-combatants. The disconnect between the “demobilization and reintegration” phases largely owed to poor roads and infrastructure that especially hampered the reintegration, which was also affected by low staff retention within the Commission, and poor communication with partners, among others. Especially during the initial stages, the program design, implementation, and monitoring and evaluation did not meet stakeholder expectations. Until early 2011, the DDR program implementation was considered supply-driven rather than demand-driven as the GoSS had limited control over the program design, implementation and resource management decisions. The demobilization and reintegration process was ill-sequenced, leaving large numbers of XCs without commensurate reintegration support mechanisms to assist them. Meanwhile, the program reintegration assistance was too short and insufficiently linked to local economies and social realities and therefore failed to make a real economic impact in the lives of the beneficiaries. An independent review¹ also concluded that the demobilization and reintegration support appeared to be more “an expensive livelihoods support program for a limited group of people rather than a relevant contribution to peace and stability in Southern Sudan.” Additionally, it came to the conclusion that the DDR's role as a confidence-booster had not been successful in lowering military spending or force levels.

The reasons that are compelling Children to join Army:

The National Child DDR project Document on the release and Re-integration of CAAFAGs (2012) highlighted the reasons that led to recruitment and use of Children as Soldiers including the following: - The Cultural Aspects, and the Socio-Economic Aspects

Challenges of DDR Pilot: they were as follows Uncertain wider political and security environment, Reinsertion and reintegration separated, limited buy-in from the military, Infrequent meetings of the DDR Council and not all ex-combatants were successful in their chosen vocations.

DDR Legal framework: The UN first got involved in disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) through the UN Observer Group in Central America (ONUCA), which was deployed in 1989, according to the historical and legal framework of the DDR Program internationally. Since then, the UN has implemented and supported DDR programs in more than 20 nations worldwide, both inside and outside the purview of peacekeeping operations. The Army Soldiers Demobilization Disarmament and Reintegration Commission shall be established by the President of the Government of Southern Sudan, according to Article (153) clause (1) of the Interim Constitution of South Sudan, in order to hasten the process of incorporating and reintegrating former combatants into other regular forces, the civil service, and other civilian institutions, as well as society. The SPLA will present plans through the DDR Commission to mobilize individuals who are underage or retired age, undoubtedly those who are/were unfit or disabled. The SPLA White Paper on Defense, Chapters (3) and (7), gave clear guidance, framework, and impetus for implementation of the DDR Program. The individual's right to voluntarily leave the SPLA will be respected, but the requirements of the SPLA and the Government of Southern Sudan come first. The DDR Commission was reestablished to manage the affairs of Disarmed and Demobilized Ex-Combatants as well as Re-integrate them into Civilian life at the Community of the Return, which was necessitated by Southern Sudan's

¹ STHLM Policy Group, December 2010.

independence from Sudan through the well-known and widely acknowledged Referendum, which occurred on July 9, 2011. The Demobilization, Disarmament, and Reintegration (DDR) Program is expressly mentioned in Article (149) clause (1) of the Transition Constitution of the Republic of South Sudan, which states that a separate commission to be known as the Demobilization, Disarmament, and Reintegration Commission shall be established. As a result, the NDDRC developed new National DDR Program Documents, DDR Policy, and DDR Strategic Plan. Two articles of the Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan, signed on August 17, 2015, set forth the DDR's most recent legal framework for South Sudan. Article (2.4.10) of the Agreement states that the following activities, among others, shall be carried out in the assembly/cantonment sites by the (MVM, AU, UNMISS, Parties) within ninety days (90) of the signing of this Agreement. Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration Activities The R-ARCSS, which was signed in 2018 in Addis Abeba, the capital of Ethiopia, revived the same article.

Comparative analysis of DDR Program in DRC Congo, Ethiopia and Eritrea: The Comparative Study of our Experience with counter experience from other Programs in Africa Continent, draw a clear picture, of how the role of governments contribute to successful implementation of a DDR Program.

In Ethiopian Experiences: Ethiopia is another success story for DDR to be told in the Horn of Africa because of national ownership. After Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) successfully obtained the state power in 1991 from Communist Military Junta; Mengistu Haile Mariam through a military defeat of government forces, a DDR program was designed to reintegrate almost 250,000 ex-soldiers for six years (1991 – 1997). According to Mulugeta Gebrehiwot's June 2016 "Transition from War to Peace" article, the program has successfully reintegrated all the ex-combatants as planned. The approach of reintegration was need-driven; rural, urban, newly recruited and old soldiers were treated differently according to their needs. Urban group was given pocket money, Loan, job placement and technical assistant, old soldiers were assisted to access their pension and, rural soldiers were given farmlands, tools, seeds and food for work. The program did not rely heavily on donors because there was little trust that the commission have the capacity to manage the donations. Although US Department of Defense and ICRC tried to support, it did not last longer. But the available resources were properly used to successfully run the program.

Eritrea Experiences: Eritrea got independence from Ethiopia in 1993 before the duo fought a border war in 1998. After signing a peace agreement in Algiers, Eritrea formed Demobilization and Reintegration Program Commission to demobilize and reintegrate 200,000 ex-combatants into a civilian life through a security sector reform process. The program was deemed successful, but the following lessons had to be learned: the importance of taking social reintegration into account; the need for a clear definition of structure and institutional responsibilities; the necessity of incorporating a gender component into the program; the importance of training in accordance with the labor market; the importance of participation from NGOs and the private sector (more in theory than practice); and the importance of conducting a survey on soldier profiles.

The Experience of DR Congo: The Emergency Demobilization Project (EDRP), which has been in operation since 2004 to the present, was established by the DDR Program in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, which was designed to demobilize about 150,000 former combatants participating in the DRC Conflict. Under the auspices of the Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration Program, the World Bank handled it with a total donation of \$200 million dollars

(MDRP). About 132,000 ex-combatants, men, women, and children were demobilized as part of the DDR Program's first phase, which was completed in December 2006. The second phase of the program, which was funded by the World Bank, the Africa Development Bank, and the government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, was intended to demobilize the following groups of people: 70,000 from the DRC's armed forces, 19,000 from militias, 8,000 children, and 40,000 former combatants who had been demobilized in the first phase and needed to be reintegrated. The Second Phase's start and finish dates were originally set for September 2008 and June 2010, respectively; however, the Process has been severely hampered by the ongoing Civil War in the Eastern DRC. As a result, rather than demobilization, the government began to be more concerned about mobilization into the armed forces. These experiences of Congo DDR Program have Similarity to the Situation of South Sudan, where the two phases of DDR encountered Serious challenges: during Phase One of CPA DDR Program, there was lack of Political will to implement the Program from governments, originated from the fear of two Parties to agreement getting back to war, should the referendum failed to be implemented on Time, or result not honored by Khartoum. In addition to, lack of Local ownership to the Program, UNDP malpractices and misappropriation of funds allocated to the DDR Program. At the same time, the Second Phase, known as new DDR Program, conducted after independence of South Sudan were not excluded from Challenges; thus, the Crises of mid-December 2013 interrupted the program because the government and oppositions were seriously engaged in mobilization rather than demobilization.

Elsewhere: the principle of national and local ownership proved useful. Rwanda, Uganda, Ethiopia, Germany to mention a few didn't rely on external support to succeed in their DDR programs. Nations took the lead which were later followed by donors. South Sudan is stuck in middle of conflict because it evaded responsibility of funding DDR to donors. Somalia ex-combatants returned to the army because the reintegration didn't succeed. Guinea Bissau ex-combatants, like South Sudan refused to leave the army because of high expectations and lack of government funds to provide pensions and post service benefits to these veteran fighters.

Methodology of the study

The research methodology applied both quantitative and qualitative methods, with source of data collection as primary and secondary. The Study area, the coverage of the research was carried out from states, counties, Payams and Bomas, selected within ten states of the three regions of South Sudan. The total set of units for which survey results are to be utilized to draw conclusions is the target population for a survey. It specifies the units for which the survey's results are intended to be generalized. In this study, the target population was 1,000,000 people of South Sudan according to 2008 census counts. The study sample of 378 respondents selected randomly within categories of; ex-combatants, community leader, DDR practitioner and Civil Society Organizations (CSO).

Data Results and Analysis


This chapter presented data analysis, interpretation and presentation of the information that was collected from the field through questionnaires. Tables, pie and bar charts were used to symbolize the data.

Sex of respondents

Sex	Frequency	Percent
Males	300	79.37
Females	78	20.63
Total	378	100.00

Sources: Primary Data 2022

The above table of analysis shows that 300 respondents were male making 79.37% and female were 78 making 20.63%




Age of respondents

Ages	Frequency	Percent
18-25	67	17.72
26-30	89	23.54
31 - 35	67	17.72
36 -40	30	7.94
46 -50	50	13.23
50 -55	30	7.94
56 and above	45	11.90
Total	378	100.00

Sources: Primary Data 2022

The above table of analysis shows the age range of respondents 18-25 years were 67 respondents with 17.72%, 26-30 years were 89 with 23.53%, 31-35 age range were 7.84%, 46-50 age range were 30 respondents with 7.94%, 50-55 age range were 45 respondents with 11.90% and 56 and Above Years were 45 respondents with 11.90




The table of analysis below, indicated the number of respondents by states and were presented as follows Western Bahr El-Ghazal was having 36 respondents making 9.5%, Northern Bahr El-Ghazal was also 37 respondents with 9.8% , Warap was having 38 respondents with 10.1%, Lakes was having 32 respondents with 8.5,% Unity was 30 respondents with 7.9%, Upper Nile was having 48 respondents with 12.7%, Jonglei state was having 35 respondents with 13.0%, Eastern Equatoria was having 35 respondents which make

9.3%, Central Equatoria state was having 39 respondents making 10.3% and Western Equatoria state was having 34 respondents making 9.0% The results indicated that majority of the respondents were from Jonglei State.

Table Showing the Percentage Distribution of Respondents by States

Counties	frequency	Percent
Western Bahr El-Ghazal	36	9.5
Northern Bahr El-Ghazal	37	9.8
Warap	38	10.1
Lakes	32	8.5
Unity	30	7.9
Upper Nile	48	12.7
Jonglei	49	13.0
Eastern Equatoria	35	9.3
Central Equatoria	39	10.3
Western Equatoria	34	9.0
Total	378	100.0

Source: Field Data; 2022




Analysis results in the below table showing distribution of respondents by Counties were presented as shown above. Wau was having 20 respondents with 5.3%, Wau Municipality was 17 respondent with 4.5%, Jur -River was 18 respondents with 4.8%, Raja was 20 respondents with 5.3%, Aweil Centre was 13 with 3.4%, Aweil Town Municipality were 18 respondents with 4.8%, Gogrial West were 17 respondents with 4.5%, Tonj North were 14 respondents with 3.7%, Twic County was having 19 respondent with 5.0%, Rumbek Town was having 11 respondents with 2.9%, Rumbek East County was 12 respondents with 3.2%, Rubkona County was 8 respondents with 2.1%, Mayom County was 11 respondents making 2.9%, Guit County was 2 respondents with 0.5%, Panyijar County were 11 respondents with 2.9%, Hai-Jalaba was 10 respondents with 2.6%, Bailiet County was 3 respondents with 0.8%, Malakal County was 15 respondents with 4.0%, Panyikang County was 12 respondents making 3.2%, Bor County was represented by 11 respondents making 2.9% Bor South County (Chueikeer County) was 13 respondents with 3.4%, Duk County was 12 respondents 3.2%, Twic East County were 10 respondents with 2.6%, Chuei-bet County were 10 respondents with 2.6%, Akobo County were 9 respondents with 2.4%, Torit County were 11 respondents with 2.9%, Yei County were 13 respondents with 3.4%, Juba County were 11 respondents with 2,9%, Luri County were 12 respondents with 3.2%, Lanya County were 4 respondents with 1.1%, and Yambio County were 11 respondents with 2.9%.

Table 4.2: Showing the Percentage Distributions of Respondents by Counties

Counties	frequency	Percent
Wau	20	5.3
Wau Muncipality	17	4.5
Jur -River	18	4.8
Raja	20	5.3
Aweil Centre	13	3.4
Aweil Town Muncipality	18	4.8
Gogrial West	17	4.5
Tonj North	14	3.7
Twic	19	5.0
Rumbek Town	11	2.9
Rumbek East	12	3.2
Rubkona	8	2.1
Mayom	11	2.9
Guit	2	0.5
Panyijar	11	2.9
Hai-Jalaba	10	2.6
Bailiet	3	0.8
Malakal	15	4.0
Panyikang	12	3.2
Bor	11	2.9
Bor South	13	3.4
Duk	12	3.2
Twic East	10	2.6
Chuei-bet	10	2.6
Akobo	9	2.4
Torit	11	2.9
Yei	13	3.4
Juba	11	2.9
Luri	12	3.2
Lanya	4	1.1
Yambio	11	2.9
Total	378	100.0

Source: Field data; 2021.



Summary, Conclusion and Recommendations

Summary of Findings

On the conclusions, the study found out that the interview turnout was 100% with most of respondents, male (79.37%), followed by female who are only **20.63%**. This is because male are the dominant heads of households and majority in the army where ex-combatants are drawn. Despite government knowledge that DDR is key to political and economic stability, it

was not incorporated into the existing government first priority programs. Apart from DDRC mass communication, respondents have seen/heard no government orders to allow ex-combatants being given land anywhere, especially in Juba where majority of them resettled, nor was there any order for them to be received by local authorities anywhere the resettle as provided by DDR policy. The conducive environment for effective reintegration has not been created by government. Ex-combatants expect to be included into the existing loan program of cooperatives and Small and Medium Enterprises, but all in vain. They also expect employment placement program to affect them, but also ended up in vain.

Conclusion

The researcher concluded that the only way to realize a successful DDR program is for: the government to own and lead the program. Create an enabling environment by improving security for investors to come, formulate policies that encourages reintegration by allocating a quota to DDR ex-combatant in all sectors of employment and other economic activities. Sensitize the public about the DDR by making national address on DDR, authorize all sectors; be it private or public to support DDR, allocate government priority on DDR by funding the DDR programs, empower DDR commission by bringing the DDR leadership close to presidency and activate the DDR Coordinating Council regular meetings. Civil Societies, religious and community leaders must also own and support DDR program morally and materially. They align the ex-combatants' interests and needs into the already-existing recovery and development programs. NGOs must incorporate ex-combatants who are in area of their coverage into their beneficiary lists and apply government designed DDR quotas program into their organization's policy. Despite the government attempt to play effective role, it has not contributed to successful reintegration of ex-combatants, which is the overall objective of every DDR program. It has not even contributed to the security sector reform of the country effectively as manifested by rampant insecurity and impunity. Reduction in military expenditure, which was one of the objectives of South Sudan DDR program has not been realized because ex-combatants are returning to their salaries in the army. The role government played in the DDR program has not lived up to the expectations of all the respondents of these research. One of the key roles of government; the funding and creation of an enabling environment for DDR program has been also lacking.

Recommendations

The government should own the DDR and treat it as one of the important national programs. Prioritize, fund and lead the security sector reform programs. For government to avoid donors and international NGOs control and manipulation of the program, it must fund the DDR programs. The government should provide security, fund Small and Medium Enterprises and encourage entrepreneurship to create an enabling environment for DDR program to succeed. Lure ex-combatants into small business by giving tax exemption to those who ventured into business. Stop accepting back in the army those formally demobilized through DDR program, President and his vice presidents to lead the governors in making public statements about the support to DDR program. Ministry of labor to formulate affirmative action policy of ex-combatant's employment quota and tie it to an award of contracts as criteria for getting the government contract. All the line ministries should be obliged to render their necessary and relevant support to ex-combatants. These practice of not executing the DDR Commission budget must stop, Empower the DDR Commission by opening direct reporting line with president as provided in the R-ARCSS 2018. UN and INGOs should play a supportive role beside the national government and avoid using their financing power to manipulate the DDR program activities to their own liking. They should provide funding and technical expertise to the government to implement effective DDR program. Advisory roles to the government and

the donors on the best practices of DDR internationally. advocate for funding and international buy-in of the DDR program in South Sudan because it is the only way-out to economic, political and security stabilization. support the national government to achieve the total peace for South Sudan. lobby and support the government on peace building, healing, reconciliation and reparation, help in economic reform and development programs. Provide cooperatives and micro-finance institutions in South Sudan Communities should discourage all forms of tribalism and hatred and support nationalism and nation building programs. Civil Societies should advocate for the full implementation of DDR Commission. Civil Society Organizations should participate in the implementation of DDR Commission, Implement the DDR policy of allowing ex-combatants to reintegrate and settle anywhere he/she found conducive for their stay., Support peace, healing & reconciliation and social cohesion, Encourage and support the DDR program in their respective communities, Incorporate ex-combatants in their social structures, Own and adopt the DDR principle of local ownership, Provide land to ex-combatants regardless of their areas of origin and encourage entrepreneurship.

References

- Abhijit Bhattacharjee, A. and Gadkarim H.A. (2012) Evaluation of Sudan Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) Program, United Nations Development Program Sudan, Final Report.
- Alden, C. (2002). Making old soldiers fade away: Lessons from the reintegration of demobilized soldiers in Mozambique. *Security Dialogue*,33(3), 341-356.
- Alusala, N. (2005). Disarmament and reconciliation: Rwanda's concerns. ISS Occasional Paper no. 108. Washington, D.C.: Institute for Security Studies.
- Berhe, DDR in Ethiopia (1991–1997) in Nathan L (ed), *Local ownership of Security Sector Reform- a guide to donors*.
- Berhe, M. G. "DDR in Ethiopia (1991–1997)." In *Local Ownership of Security Sector Reform- a Guide to Donors*, edited by L. Nathan. Birmingham University press, 2007
- Bhattacharjee, Abhijit, and Hassan Ali Gadkarim. *Evaluation of Sudan Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) Programme*, (2012) a study report commissioned by and presented to UNDP and Sudan DDR donors,.
- Bloomfield, D., Barnes, T., & Huyse, C. (Eds.) (2003). *Reconciliation after violent conflict: A handbook*. Stockholm: International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance.
- Bowd, R., & Özerdem, A. (2013). How to assess social reintegration of ex-combatants. *Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding*,7(4), 453-475.
- Brewer, Cecily, (2010). *Disarmament in South Sudan*, Center for Complex Operations.
- Bryden, A., June (2007). "Linkages between DDR and SSR". Presented at the 2nd International Conference on DDR and Stability in Africa. Kinshasa: UN/OSAA, 12-14
- Buxton, J. (2008). *Reintegration and long-term development: Linkages and challenges*. Thematic Working Paper 5. Bradford: Centre for International Cooperation and Security, University of Bradford.
- Clark, J. N. (2010). National unity and reconciliation in Rwanda: A flawed approach? *Journal of Contemporary African Studies*,28(2), 137-154.
- Duthie, R. (2010). *Local justice and reintegration processes as complements to transitional justice and DDR*. New York, NY: International Center for Transitional Justice.
- Edmonds, M., Mills, G., & McNamee, T. (2009). Disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration and local ownership in the Great Lakes: The experience of Rwanda, Burundi, and the Democratic Republic of Congo. *African Security*,2(1), 29-58.
- Haile, G. and Bara, T. (2013). *Final Evaluation of Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration Program Individual Reintegration Project Component (2009-2012)*, SSDDRC and UNDP. Juba, South Sudan (September 2013)
- Human Security Baseline Assessment (HSBA) for Sudan and South Sudan, 2013, Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration.
- ICRC. (2017). *Handbook on data protection in humanitarian action*, ICRC: Geneva
- Jairo Munive (2013), *Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration in South Sudan: The Limits of Conventional Peace and Security Templates*.
- Kasaija Apuuli, Philip, *Durable Stability in South Sudan: What are the Re- requisites?* 2018.
- Lamb G and Stainer, T 2018. The Conundrum of DDR Coordination. The Case of South Sudan, *Stability: International Journal of Security and Development*, 7(1), p.9.DOI: <http://doi.org/10.5334/sta.628>.
- LO, Manual of Training and Employment Options for Ex-Combatants. Geneva: ILO, 1997. <<http://www.oit.org/public/english/employment/crisis/download/excombe.pdf>>
- LO, Manual of Training and Employment Options for Ex-Combatants. Geneva: ILO, 1997. <<http://www.oit.org/public/english/employment/crisis/download/excombe.pdf>>
- Nezam, T., & Marc, A. (2009). *Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration*. Washington, DC: Social Development Department, World Bank. Retrieved from

<http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTSOCIALDEVELOPMENT/Resources/244362-1164107274725/DDRFinal3-print.pdf>

- Nilsson, A. (2005). Reintegrating ex-combatants in post-war societies. Stockholm: Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency
- Pouligny, B., The Politics and Anti-Politics of Contemporary “Disarmament, Demobilization & Reintegration” Programs. Paris: CERI and SGDN, 2004. <<http://www.ceri-sciences-po.org/cherlist/pouligny/rapportpouligny.pdf>>.
- Republic of South Sudan (2020). DDR Commission Standard Operating Procedures 2020, SSDDRC, July 2020.
- Republic of South Sudan (2020). National Reintegration Framework in the Republic of South Sudan 2020, July 2020.
- Republic of South Sudan (2020). Public Information and Strategic Communication in Support of the Republic of South Sudan DDR 2020
- Republic of South Sudan (2020). Reinsertion Framework in the Republic of South Sudan DDR 2020, April 2020.
- Republic of South Sudan (2020). Revised Policy Paper on Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration in the Republic of South Sudan 2020, SSDDRC, July 2020.
- Republic of South Sudan, National DDR Strategic Plan and Programme in the Republic of South Sudan 2020, SSDDRC, July 2020.
- RJMEC Quarterly Report, Jul – September 30, 2019.
- South Sudan Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Commission and United Nations Development Programme, Final Evaluation of the DDR Individual Reintegration Project Component, 2009 – 2012. Juba September, 2013.
- UNDP, Stabilization Needs Assessment of Greater Jonglei Area and Greater Pibor, 2018.
- UNICEF Procedure for Ethical Standards in Research, Evaluation, Data Collection and Analysis; Document Number: CF/PD/DRP/2015-001 Effective Date: 01 April 2015 Issued by: Director, Division of Data, Research and Policy (DRP).
- Weber, M., “Politics as a vocation” in H.H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills (eds.). From Max Weber:Essays in Sociology. New York: Oxford University Press, 1946, pp. 77-128. <http://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Politics_as_a_Vocation>.

Cite this article:

Wilson Lual Lual Malong (2022). The roles of South Sudan Government in the Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration of Ex-combatants: A case of South Sudan Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Commission. *International Journal of Science and Business*, 17(1), 1-20. doi: <https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.7127494>

Retrieved from <http://ijsab.com/wp-content/uploads/991.pdf>

Published by

